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 This thesis investigates the relationship between belief and scepticism in 
DeLillo’s story-worlds, and reads his texts as evidencing belief amid stark 
cynicism. It shows how belief can manifest itself in literature that depicts 
conditions acutely hostile to faith. The belief-scepticism dialectic is characteristic 
of DeLillo’s writing, and is reflected in his conflation of serious and comic voices 
(to varying degrees in different texts). Studying this aspect of DeLillo’s texts is 
hence important in helping us to gain a better understanding of how to read them.   
 My first chapter draws on critic Linda Hutcheon’s theory of parody as 
being both critical and affirmative. Focusing on White Noise and Underworld, it 
will be shown how DeLillo’s parody of belief systems and spiritual experiences 
throws them into comic relief, yet is implicitly affirmative of them. This can be 
seen in the highly fascinating interplay between sincerity and joking which runs 
through his fictional writings. With reference to psychoanalytic thinker Sigmund 
Freud’s Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, I argue that DeLillo’s texts 
conceal belief behind a skeptical front. His repeated jokes and religious references 
are symptoms of a deeper belief in an over-arching entity beyond tangible 
existence – they hint at an underlying seriousness. 
 The second chapter proceeds to examine how DeLillo’s apparent critique 
of new religious movements in The Names and Mao II is ironically woven in with 
his affirmation of man’s spiritual impulses and the need for faith. While the texts 
offer a critique of religious excesses, their recognition of the religions’ powerful 
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appeal also reveals a desire for a transcendent power able to satisfy man’s very 
real spiritual hunger.  
 The third chapter employs psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva’s notion of 
melancholia to argue that melancholia in DeLillo’s texts can partly be attributed 
to his characters’ loss of originary spiritual fullness. His characters’ melancholia 
indicates their implicit belief in the transcendent. They also lends an element of 
tragic beauty to their treatment of loss by transforming what is otherwise psychic 
waste into beauty and pleasure for the reader (and themselves), hence executing a 
recycling and redemptive performance. The aestheticization of melancholia is an 
attempt at redemption through art, in order to temporarily console or compensate 
for the loss. 
 It can be seen that DeLillo negotiates space for belief in textual landscapes 
which are antithetical to its existence. The tension between faith and scepticism, 





BELIEF AND DELILLO’S DOUBTING LANDSCAPE 
 
It can be said that all of DeLillo’s fiction is a meditation on the question raised 
in his novel Mao II: “When the Old God leaves the world, what happens to all the 
unexpended faith?” (7). This is the sombre, albeit sceptical, contemplation of the 
character Rodge Janney as he witnesses the spiritual fervour and millennial frenzy 
generated at a Moonie mass wedding. DeLillo acknowledges the general demise of 
traditional organized religion, specifically Judeo-Christianity, in a post-Nietzschean 
world in which God – an omnipotent, omniscient, and transcendent Being – has 
theoretically been killed and exposed as nothing more than a product of the human 
mythic imagination. As another of DeLillo’s characters, Gary Harkness, articulates in 
End Zone, the concept of God or a transcendent Being is “incredibly outmoded. It 
makes absolutely no theological sense” (94). This kind of scepticism often signals a 
rejection of religious belief. However, DeLillo’s endorsement of the value and 
tenacity of “faith” in the quotation from Mao II reveals his unwillingness to 
relinquish the possibility of belief. Faith refers to the persistence of belief despite 
imperfect vision and understanding. The Christian apostle Paul considers human 
knowledge of life as incomplete, and compares our vision to seeing a reflection in the 
mirror instead of perceiving the original object: “For now we see in a mirror dimly, 
but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know fully, just as I also 
have been fully known” (New American Standard Bible, 1 Cor. 13:12). Philosopher 
John Caputo elaborates on this “famous Pauline formulae for faith” by defining it “in 
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Hebrews 11:1 as the hypostasis, the real stuff of what is not real yet but only hoped 
for, as the substance of things that have no substance yet, and as the elenchos, the 
proof positive of what cannot be calculatively proven” (149). DeLillo locates himself 
at an ironic distance from Rodge’s scepticism of post-God spiritualities. For DeLillo, 
the departure of the Old God does not mean the end of spiritual hunger, but the 
redirection of spiritual desire into alternative and equally plausible channels of 
worship. Indeed, this study argues that belief exists in DeLillo’s world amid caustic 
scepticism, and it is this agonistic relationship between belief and cynicism that 
makes for the mental drama.  
Focusing on four texts by DeLillo (The Names, White Noise, Mao II, and 
Underworld), this thesis examines the relationship between scepticism and spiritual 
belief in DeLillo’s story-worlds.1 My claim is that DeLillo’s fiction evidences belief 
despite scepticism, revealing its tempered affirmation of spiritual experiences and 
faith, even including the possible existence of a transcendent reality or being. His 
fiction manifests the symptoms of belief through parody, irony and critique, and 
literary melancholia. Firstly, parody affirms its object even as it critiques it. DeLillo’s 
textual scepticism is a veneer which conceals the affirmation of spiritual experiences. 
His characters meet with certain internal barriers to an open presentation of faith. 
Hence, we see only traces of their belief through their use of humour. Secondly, his 
critique of certain religious movements ironically presents the need for spiritual faith, 
and his endorsement of religious impulses. Finally, the melancholia in his characters 
bespeaks spiritual lack, and is a sign of the continuing presence of belief.  
                                                 
1 These are the texts in which DeLillo more explicitly engages with the issues of spirituality. Critic 
Mark Osteen also highlights these four texts as providing evidence of “transcendence in unlikely 
places” (258). 
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Critics have long recognized the spirituality implicit in DeLillo’s works. 
Spirituality, as I am using the term, refers to “a way of being and experiencing that 
comes through awareness of a transcendental dimension and that is characterized by 
certain identifiable values in regard to self, others, nature, life and whatever one 
considers to be ultimate” (Elkins et al. 1988).2 That which is ultimate can be 
considered to be sacred; and the sacred, according to historian Mircea Eliade, is that 
which centres one’s world: “The sacred reveals absolute reality and at the same time 
makes orientation possible; hence it founds the world in the sense that it fixes the 
limits and establishes the order of the world” (30). Therefore, central to any 
discussion on spirituality would be the human quest for a transcendent that structures 
one’s world (for example, God, a power greater than self, a value system, or cosmic 
consciousness). From the bildungsroman of his first novel Americana, to the struggle 
for existential meaning in the cultural wasteland of Cosmopolis, DeLillo’s fiction 
consistently engages with issues of spirituality. Critic Michael Oriad, in one of the 
earliest scholarly analysis of DeLillo’s fiction in the 1970s, examines DeLillo’s first 
four novels and observes that the protagonists are engaged in the spiritual quest for 
“the source of life’s meaning” (6). DeLillo’s concern with spirituality has intensified 
since then, leading critic Vince Passaro to comment that the “subdued religious 
sentiment that runs through all his work has never been more evident than in 
                                                 
2 Spirituality exists as a rather nebulous concept today; it has taken on diverse meanings in 
contemporary Western societies, and has been interpreted and expressed in manifold ways, from 
Christianity, to Islamic fundamentalism, esoteric cults, and the New Age. Furthermore, spiritual 
concepts and experiences often exceed what human linguistic resources are able to capture. Hence, 
while I am employing a working concept of spirituality, it needs to be emphasized that any definition 
would inevitably resist fixity because of the fluid nature of this particular field of study. Spirituality 
manifests itself either in systemic form (as in religious organization), or on a more individual basis. 
Religion is an organized vision of the world with a coherence of its own, supported by certain rituals 
and practices. In other words, it creates a cosmology with a particular interpretation of life.  
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Underworld” (74). To critic Mark Osteen, DeLillo’s work “catalogues the varieties of 
American religious experience” (2), echoing American psychologist and philosopher 
William James’ pluralistic account of religious experience. While this form of 
categorization undoubtedly makes concrete the otherwise abstract notion of spiritual 
experience, it implicitly locates DeLillo in a scientific and objective frame outside the 
hunger that I have signalled earlier on. DeLillo criticism has tended to centre on his 
uncanny ability to evoke the zeitgeist of contemporary life, and there remains much to 
be explored of spirituality in DeLillo’s fiction. 3 DeLillo himself has also neither 
explicitly commented on his personal spiritual affiliations nor identified a clear 
religious belief. Hence, “leftover faith” is not just DeLillo’s biographical oddity.   
 As noted by critic Arthur Saltzman, there is an urge toward transcendence 
which is reflected in a continuity of treatment in novels by DeLillo himself, and a 
fascination on the part of characters (“Awful” 304). It is useful here to refer to scholar 
Louis Roy’s definition of a transcendent experience as “an event in which 
individuals, by themselves or in a group, have the impression that they are in contact 
with something boundless and limitless, which they cannot grasp, and which utterly 
surpasses human capacities” (xi; italics mine).4 This definition conceives of the 
                                                 
3 In their readings of DeLillo’s fiction, critics have focused on thematic studies of Cold War history 
and the predominance of paranoia narratives (Steffen Hantke), how the mediation of technology 
interrupts the formation of identity (Douglas Keesey), and the nature of language (Cowart). As another 
means of discerning the critical gap, note how spirituality in DeLillo’s fiction has also not been as 
thoroughly explored as Thomas Pynchon to whom DeLillo is often compared. For comparative studies 
of Pynchon and DeLillo, refer to Timothy Parrish and Carol Ostrowski. Pynchon criticism is rich in 
studies of the spiritual aspects of his work – see Edward Mendelson, Molly Hite, Steven Weisenburger, 
Dwight Eddins, Tom LeClair, and David Porush. 
4 Roy’s methodology is phenomenological: while it opens up our understanding of being, it is limited 
to that which can be exp erienced by the human being. This approach contrasts with the view of the 
transcendent as an objective other which exists independently of the human subject. Roy’s definition 
provides a means of discussing certain profound experiences, even if DeLillo’s texts present the 
transcendent as more than just subjective, as I will argue.  
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transcendent as something that exceeds human imagination and control; it 
encompasses some spiritual experiences, but is not necessarily limited to them. It 
makes possible the discussion of transcendence, which would otherwise remain as an 
ineffable event. More crucially, it also leaves open the question of whether the 
individual’s subjective internal impressions actually correspond to an objective 
external reality. Transcendent moments pervade DeLillo’s fiction and embody some 
form of spiritual significance for DeLillo’s characters. His protagonists reveal various 
emotional responses to the transcendent, ranging from fear, insecurity, and anxiety to 
scepticism of religious experiences. In the 1988 DeCurtis interview, DeLillo 
comments: “I think that’s something that has been in the background of my work: a 
sense of something extraordinary hovering just beyond our touch and just beyond our 
vision” (330). DeLillo’s fiction demonstrates his fascination with the Kantian notion 
of the noumenon, or thing- in- itself (“Ding an sich” in German) – an unknowable, 
indescribable reality that, in some way, lies “behind” an observed or experienced 
phenomenon, and is beyond human cognition.  
 DeLillo gestures towards a more open and fluid conception of the sacred than 
what is traditionally accepted. He confesses in an interview with Andrew Billen: “I 
feel a drive toward some kind of transcendence, perhaps religious but not in 
traditional ways” (qtd. in Cowart 195). He represents forms of transcendence which 
differ from traditional religious experiences – transcendence that is derived not from a 
supreme Being, but from primal sources of energy and meanings which, though often 
untellable, are equally valid and plausible. At times, transcendence is triggered by 
man-made events which nevertheless take on a metaphysical quality often affirmed 
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by DeLillo, for instance the toxic cloud in White Noise that becomes a source of the 
sublime: “Our fear was accompanied by a sense of awe that bordered on the 
religious” (127). Where is the lift in these moments of elevation and heightened 
experiences, and what end do they serve in DeLillo’s narratives? This thesis examines 
how the transcendent event is represented in DeLillo’s narratives.  
 DeLillo is ultimately open and attracted to the notion of a transcendent reality 
or the noumenal, albeit not with the same kind of earnest readiness to embrace it as 
another American writer Annie Dillard who writes in a tone of optimistic 
anticipation: “You don't run down the present, pursue it with baited hooks and nets. 
You wait for it, empty-handed, and you are filled” (104). He recognizes the 
persistence of transcendent experiences in human life and portrays these moments in 
a sympathetic way which contrasts with his usual irony. DeLillo hints at the genuine 
nature of the external realities to which transcendent experiences supposedly 
correspond. Empiricism and reason make us liable to scepticism, but DeLillo 
recognizes the limits and fallibility of human perception, and the noumenal as an 
intrinsic element of human existence. In other words, despite his scepticism about 
transcendent experiences, he comes across as ultimately believing in their authenticity 
as objective events, and even celebrating these moments as possible means of 
reaching beyond. In DeLillo’s narratives, man is often defined by a deep sense of 
loss, whether nameable or not, which drives him to quest for wholeness and ineffable 
totality. Defined by intrinsic existential limits, man is incomplete. Transcendence 
offers one way through which the self can be fulfilled as it seeks to become whole.  
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It is crucial at this point to comment briefly on two issues: the use of the 
oxymoronic phrase “transcendent reality,” and the assumed gap between 
subjective/internal and objective/external states. The numinous, as defined by 
German theologian Rudolf Otto, is that which “completely eludes apprehension in 
terms of concepts” (5). James asserts that mystical experiences “break down the 
authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic consciousness, based upon the 
understanding and the senses alone. They show it to be only one kind of 
consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth” (423). If the 
transcendent transgresses man’s cognitive borders, how can one tell the supposedly 
untellable? How then can the noumenal be articulated and made intelligible to human 
understanding and perception? DeLillo’s answer lies in the “physics of language” 
(Underworld 542), an expression used by Jesuit priest Father Paulus in Underworld 
to refer to how language enables us to envision the world: “You didn’t see the thing 
because you don’t know how to look. And you don’t know how to look because you 
don’t know the names” (540). He illustrates this theory in a session with the young 
Nick Shay during which the latter is made to name the parts of a shoe. DeLillo’s 
“physics of language” suggests the need for science to accommodate the apparently 
transcendent. In this way, we would have the language to make sense of the 
transcendent. 
The concept of objectivity is tenuous. Is the transcendent experience a product 
of the poetic imagination, or is there an actual metaphysical reality independent of 
man’s subjectivity? Philosopher Immanuel Kant emphasizes transcendental 
subjectivity; for him, the sublime is not objective, but a product of the human mind: 
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“true sublimity must be sought only in the mind (Gemüt) of the judging Subject, and 
not in the Object of nature that occasions this attitude formed of it” (256). It becomes 
difficult to delineate the boundary between the objective and the subjective, or even 
to establish the existence of an objective. DeLillo posits a transcendent which exists 
independently of man’s consciousness; he is hence more open to spiritual discourse 
(although DeLillo also seems to believe that God is essentially unknowable). His 
representation of the transcendent can be aligned with theologian Friedrich 
Schleiermacher’s feeling of absolute dependence as “the consciousness that the whole 
of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of us” (16), and with Otto’s 
view of the numinous as “objective and outside the self” (11).  
Critics John A. McClure and Arthur Saltzman have read DeLillo’s attitude 
towards spiritual belief and experiences as primarily one of scepticism, doubt, and 
even outright disbelief. In a study primarily based on Pynchon, 
McClure examines how American fiction writers, including DeLillo, attempt to re-
invest the world with a sense of the sacred, albeit in a manner which is “cosmically 
irreverent” yet “comically cosmic” (148). In other words, secular rationalization and 
its alternatives to the sacred are all presented as existential possibilities that are 
simultaneously being undermined by the text, resulting in an entropic collapse of 
belief. McClure’s emphasis on the sublime quality of DeLillo’s texts, and his view of 
the author’s fiction as an effort to re-enchant the contemporary world, initially seem 
to hold out much for DeLillo’s spiritual vision. McClure has pertinently highlighted 
that, while most versions of postmodernism are hostile to religious discourses centred 
on an experience of transcendence, there are versions of postmodernism that 
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accommodate spiritual discourses.5 He rightly notes a disjunction between the 
tendency of cultural theorists like Fredric Jameson, Jean-François Lyotard, and Brian 
McHale to view postmodernism as “thoroughly and satisfactorily secularized” and “a 
resurgence (by no means unprecedented) of spiritual energies, discourses, and 
commitments” (142) in American social reality. He distinguishes between two strands 
of postmodernism: one which views it as the fulfilment of secularization; and the 
other offering counter-definitions which “represent the postmodern project as one of 
re-enchantment and of a post-colonial return of the repressed” (147).6 As McClure 
has pointed out, the most prominent accounts of the postmodern have issued from 
Marxist theorist Jameson and French philosopher Lyotard, both of which appear to 
establish an antithetical relationship between postmodernity and spirituality. For 
Jameson, postmodernism is “the consumption of sheer commodification as a process” 
(x). Dominated by the forces of late capitalism, postmodern society is characterized 
by globalization, pervasive consumerist values, a preoccupation with spectacle and 
images generated by the media, and technological growth. These elements would 
seem to combine to diminish the influence of religion on the lives of people. 
DeLillo’s novels resonate with Jamesonian postmodernism in his portrayal of a world 
                                                 
5 As critic Stuart Sim points out in his preface to The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism, 
postmodernism cannot be reduced to a singular, univocal vision of the world, and “re mains a 
notoriously diffuse cultural movement” (xii). One central problem in the attempt to define 
postmodernism is how to distinguish it from modernism. For instance, postmodernist scepticism seems 
to be an extension of the modernist questioning of tradit ional concepts of temporality, religion, and 
subjectivity. Yet, for the postmodernist critic, such questioning is no longer confined to an avant-garde 
intelligentsia. 
6 Refer to sociologist David Lyon who argues that although the secularization of Western society has 
led to the deregulation and deinstitutionalization of religion, there is a general trend of re-enchantment 
in many parts of the contemporary world. Science and technology, the hallmarks of modernity, are 
unable to fully satisfy man or provide answers to existential questions. Hence, while it may appear that 
the bulwarks of spirituality are being irrevocably corroded by the forces of science and technology, 
there is in fact a heightened interest in new forms of spirituality within Western cultures. 
Postmodernity has not eradicated spirituality, but merely transformed, re-situated, and restructured it. 
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in the grips of late capitalism and enthralled by the values of capitalist acquisition. 
For instance, Jack Gladney in White Noise feels that “[t]he system had blessed [his] 
life” (46) as the automated teller machine displays his account balance. Capitalism 
has become a form of religion with the power to affirm one’s self-esteem and 
identity. Hence, in White Noise, Jack “sensed that something of deep personal value, 
but not money, not that at all, had been authenticated and confirmed” (46).  
 Lyotard has also famously described postmodernism as “incredulity towards 
all metanarratives” (xxiv), a loss of faith in universalizing and totalizing theories, or 
grand narratives (“grands récits”), which formerly legitimized the status quo.7 The 
Platonic notion of absolute or objective Truth is undermined as all beliefs are 
revealed to be constructs rather than reflections of an objective reality “out there” 
which exists independently of the mind. For instance, neo-pragmatists like 
philosopher Richard Rorty embrace a contingent view of truth: there can be multiple 
truths according to each community. No knowledge is privileged and it is through 
postmodernism that we are able to question “the very bases of any certainty” such as 
“history, subjectivity” and “reference” as well as “any standards of judgment” 
(Hutcheon, Poetics 57). According to Richard Tarnas: “The postmodernist paradigm 
is by its nature fundamentally subversive of all paradigms [except itself], for at its 
core is the awareness of reality as being at once multiple, local and temporal, and 
without demonstrable foundation” (401). Hence, to be postmodern in one’s outlook is 
“to embrace scepticism about what our culture stands for and strives for” (Sim, vii). 
For literary critic Tobin Siebers, “scepticism now describes more than anything else 
                                                 
7 This means a rejection of the ideals associated with the 18th century Enlightenment project (Western 
rationality, logocentricism, liberal humanism, progress) which postmodernists deem to have failed, as 
well as Hegelian dialectics and Marxist abolishment of social classes through revolution. 
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the project of opposing thought to itself” (3), and “[b]elief as a category has become 
psychologically and epistemologically suspect” (12).8    
 It would appear that postmodernity seems highly inimical to spiritual belief. It 
is commonly seen as antithetical to the certainties and teleological view of history 
held by Christianity. 9 However McClure believes that postmodernism should not 
merely celebrate the demise of grand narratives, but also accommodate multiple 
voices and points of view which may have been previously suppressed. 
Postmodernity stimulates religious interest and discourses; furthermore, it transforms 
traditional perceptions and structures of spirituality, and creates the conditions for the 
growth of new forms of spiritualities. In embracing openness to the unknown, 
postmodernity can be conducive to the proliferation of spiritualities which often 
deviate from traditional faith and belief. This may be linked to the growth of 
Lyotard’s self- legitimating “little narratives” (60). In the entry on the sacred in the 
Encyclopedia of Postmodernism, it is suggested that “[o]ne plausible genealogy of 
postmodernity begins with Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God” (349); 
however, it is also stated that “[t]he death of God does not foreclose questions of 
transcendence and radical alterity, but instead underscores their urgency” (349).10 
                                                 
8 In Cold War Criticism and the Politics of Scepticism, his efforts to think against scepticism are 
structured on showing how sceptics have slipped into easy dogmatic positions the nature of which they 
have ironically set out to critique. 
9 At this point, I would like to intrude my discussion with a brief self-reflexive meditation on writing 
about the postmodern in its aftermath. The analysis of the postmodern does not necessarily have to 
adopt its premises and methodology unquestioningly. While postmodernism has made ambiguous and 
uncertain the process of reading texts, determining meaning, and ascertaining truth, this should not 
throw us into a vertiginous spin in which all ideas are free to float past critical scrutiny. Rather, reading 
in the postmodern means one needs to be even more stringent and vigilant. There is truth, but one 
which is endlessly open to being transformed by new knowledge and discourses. This is provisional 
truth, but truth nevertheless, and my narrative here is open to other counter-narratives.     
10 Even though the traditional conception of God as transcendental Being is often obliterated, rejected, 
or contested in modernist and postmodernist theories, the transcendent seems to return insidiously in 
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Educator Arthur J. DeJong, for instance, states that postmodernism “emphasizes 
openness and diversity; it reintroduces awe and mystery. While it does not demand 
transcendence, it allows, perhaps even suggests, transcendency” (99). The 
postmodern (and perhaps, prematurely declared) death of God is merely one narrative 
out of an infinite number of stories that can be generated.11  
DeLillo’s texts present a postmodern world in which spirituality is not in 
demise but flourishing. Old forms of religion are in demise, but one sees the rise of 
new spiritualities which may not necessarily be expressed through the structures of 
organized religions. In the multiplicity and plurality it proffers, this change could be 
considered a specifically postmodern phenomenon. As reviewer David Bosworth 
observes about DeLillo’s “latterday spiritual questors”: “In a world bereft of 
sanctioned holiness, in a world of adamant relativity, they are mad jazz-monks, 
improvising their own ceremonies, their own strange gods, scratching frantic 
liturgical graffiti on the face of the Void” (45). For instance, in White Noise, 
characters have no qualms adopting an eclectic cocktail of spiritual beliefs. DeLillo’s 
story-worlds reflect the process of resacralization – the return to spirituality and faith, 
and the re- investment of the world with a sacred quality. Psychologist Abraham 
Maslow defines resacralization as the regaining of one’s sense of the sacred in life – a 
                                                                                                                                           
new guises as Lyotard’s sublime and the unpresentable, James Hillman’s soul and image, Derrida’s 
negative theology and the impossible, and Emmanuel Levinas’ absolute other. 
11 This recalls critic Brian McHale on “the dominant” in Constructing Postmodernism – the renewed 
importance of narrative to global literary studies. McHale charts the rise of narratology in the sixties 
and seventies, then a shift from “theories about narrative” to “stories about theory” (4). Since one of 
the chief characteristics of postmodernism is the end of metanarratives (as signalled by Lyotard), none 
of these stories triumphs as “the story of stories”; what has proliferated instead is a series of more 
provisional “little” or “minor” narratives (6). 
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factor he views as essential for self-actualization. 12 It means “being willing, once 
again, to see a person ‘under the aspect of eternity,’ as Spinoza says, or […] being 
able to see the sacred, the eternal, the symbolic” (50).  
However, McClure highlights the counter-constructions to postmodern 
scepticism only to show how DeLillo’s texts negate or undercut the implicit “post-
secular project of resacralization” (144) present within themselves. McClure argues 
for DeLillo’s undecidability, nihilism, and rejection of the God-notion. In McClure’s 
reading of DeLillo: “DeLillo’s work […] insistently interrogates secular conceptions 
of the real, both by focusing the reader’s attention on events that remain mysterious 
or even ‘miraculous,’ and by making all sorts of room for religious or spiritual 
discourses and styles of seeing” (142-43). McClure is also against the privileging of 
magic as a discourse to structure power, and confesses to being suspicious (or “drawn 
up short” as he puts it) of DeLillo’s attribution of the cause of John F. Kennedy’s 
assassination to forces which transcend politics and history (159).13 McClure locates 
DeLillo almost unquestioningly as a postmodernist writer who stands in a neutral 
space between cynicism and belief. 14 While I concur with McClure regarding 
                                                 
12 Maslow considers desacralization, the loss of the lived sense of the sacred, to be a kind of defence 
mechanism, allowing one to stay safe in cynicism. However, “[s]elf-actualization means giving up this 
defense mechanism and learning or being taught to resacralize” (49).  
13 In the same article, McClure quotes DeLillo as saying in an interview: “Oswald’s attempt on 
Kennedy was more complicated. I think it was based on elements outside politics and, as someone in 
the novel says, outside history – things like dreams and coincidences and even the movement or the 
configuration of the stars, which is one reason the book is called Libra” (159). Critic Cowart compares 
DeLillo to American writer Norman Mailer in his treatment of magic. He refers to Mailer’s character 
Stephen Rojack (in An American Dream) who articulates the notion that the roots of human 
civilization lie with magic stolen from the gods. This leads to a deep sense of guilt and fear of the 
vengeance of the supernatural beings, as evidenced in the phrase “magic, dread, and the perception of 
death” (Mailer 15). Cowart draws a parallel between Rojack and Murray Jay Siskind in White Noise 
who desires to “immerse [himself …] in American magic and dread” (19).    
14 Critics Ruppersburg and Engles assert that any study of the author has to engage with the “debate 
that still continues over whether DeLillo should be classified as a postmodernist or as a contemporary 
modernist” (12). However, more recently, critic Jesse Kavadlo has pointed out that DeLillo’s fiction 
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DeLillo’s tendencies towards resacralization and the author’s simultaneous 
questioning of aspects of spirituality, McClure’s insistence on the rational as a frame 
of thought limits the textual possibilities he can derive from DeLillo’s fiction. In 
questioning his view of DeLillo as being undecided about the spiritual dimension, I 
would like to offer a reading of DeLillo’s texts as less politically neutral and more 
inclined towards spiritual belief. They do not recommend a pathway to heaven, but do 
testify, in some unusual way, that there is a “destination” of some sort.  
 In the same vein, Saltzman asserts that “[b]y interrogating the accessibility 
and the merit of transcendental moments, Underworld focuses and extends an interest 
that appears throughout DeLillo’s fictions” (“Awful” 304). Saltzman acknowledges 
that instead of resistance to the notion of transcendence, DeLillo clearly recognizes 
and affirms the human desire for it. However, for Saltzman, this urge to transcend 
only exists as the object of satirical deflation. Saltzman questions the nature of 
DeLillo’s transcendence, which stems from human corruption to paradoxically 
produce epiphany, and concludes that instead of transcendence, what remain are just 
unresolved yearnings and ambiguity of interpretation. Saltzman claims that these 
experiences lack religious veracity. One might ask here: “Compared to what? Is there 
a universal basis for judging the veracity of an experience?” Saltzman then suggests 
that DeLillo perches us in a “difficult, complicated peace” (“Awful” 313) between the 
undeniable human urge towards transcendence and the absence of genuine religious 
experience, hence the title of Saltzman’s article “Awful Symmetries in Don DeLillo’s 
Underworld.” For Saltzman, the absence of any objective transcendent reality leaves 
                                                                                                                                           
goes beyond the prescience, presentism, and postmodernism with which it is often associated. Kavadlo 
is against the emphasis placed on these misdirected issues of fashion by various critics like James 
Wood, Vince Passaro, and B. R. Meyers. 
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DeLillo’s characters disturbingly stranded in their solipsistic worlds – there are only 
entropic remains which we embrace in worship. However, according to Saltzman, this 
is better than surrendering to a god who really does not exist; our inexorable 
yearnings can only find partial fulfilment in secondary sources since the divine is 
merely an illusion. In Saltzman’s view, then, DeLillo wishes he could be religious, 
but his other beliefs will not allow it. In his eagerness to prove the irresolution and 
terminal nature of transcendence in Underworld, Saltzman may have underestimated 
the celebratory quality that DeLillo seems to ascribe to some of these transcendent 
experiences.  
 Like McClure and Saltzman, I recognize DeLillo’s ambivalence towards 
organized religion and his fascination with numinous alternatives. However, by 
emphasizing the sceptical quality of DeLillo’s representation of transcendent 
experiences, they seem to have ignored the possibility that DeLillo also celebrates 
some of these moments as genuine indicators of what lies beyond. DeLillo 
consistently explores the tension between scepticism and spiritual belief in 
postmodernism, and ultimately affirms the spiritual dimension of human existence. 
He gestures at the possibility of accessing primal sources of meanings – something 
which McClure and Saltzman dismiss. DeLillo’s parodic style satirizes, challenges, 
and questions certain beliefs in spiritual transcendence, but he seems to accept the 
possibility of a genuine transcendent reality which can be addressed. Furthermore, the 
fact that DeLillo depicts postmodern conditions (as described by Jameson and 
Lyotard) serves only to heighten the central contradiction I wish to discuss – spiritual 
belief amid extreme scepticism. This thesis does not attempt to determine if DeLillo 
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is modernist or postmodernist, but instead focuses on how DeLillo’s texts resist a 
straightforward reading of outright rejection of the transcendent. I am using the term 
“postmodern” in this thesis as a provisional working concept to refer to a set of often 
contradictory tendencies that reflect intellectual, aesthetic, as well as social trends in 
the developed and postindustrial contemporary world. It is hence a descriptive, rather 
than prescriptive, definition. 
Critics Paul Maltby and Mark Osteen have responded in part to the cynical 
readings offered by McClure and Saltzman with their own emphases on DeLillo’s 
intimate links to the noumenal. Maltby’s reading of DeLillo’s transcendent moments 
contrasts with Saltzman’s. Maltby relates the intensity of DeLillo’s transcendent 
events to the Romantic “visionary moment” (258). In his influential essay “The 
Romantic Metaphysics of Don DeLillo,” Maltby establishes DeLillo’s associations 
with Romantic aesthetics and sensibilities in The Names, White Noise and Libra: “His 
Romantic appeals to a primal language of vision, to the  child’s psyche as a 
medium of precious insight, to the sublime contravene the anti-metaphysical norms of 
postmodern theory” (512). Unlike the ambiguity proposed by McClure and Saltzman, 
Maltby considers these transcendent moments capable of regenerating faith and self-
confidence, hence his reading opens up other possibilities of interpreting DeLillo’s 
texts away from the lens of a sceptical postmodernism. However, by limiting the 
scope of transcendence to the Romantic sublime, his analysis has largely ignored the 
spiritual nature of the characters’ quest for the sacred (the centre of one’s world) with 
which DeLillo is concerned. The concept of the Romantic sublime does not include 
the notion of the sacred, and is hence a limitation of Maltby’s thesis. 
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Resacralization also forms the theme of critic Mark Osteen in his exploration 
of the dialectics between “American magic and dread” (White Noise 19), a phrase 
used by the character Murray Jay Siskind in the novel White Noise. According to 
Osteen, American cultural forces implacably assail the human subject, imprisoning 
him in an increasingly fragmented world. In White Noise, the fear of death and the 
return of the repressed indicate the failure of consumerist technology to appease these 
old ghosts. In order to counter the dread produced by a media-saturated consumerist 
culture, the disintegration of traditional centres, and the uncertainties and madness of 
postmodern life, DeLillo’s characters turn to magic in the attempt to revive 
sacredness and communality. Hence, Osteen recognizes the characters’ desires for 
resacralization and attributes it to the despair or dread generated by American culture. 
Their quests ultimately fail to fulfil, but they nevertheless point to some form of 
possible redemption. Osteen argues that while DeLillo critiques the totalizing and 
consumerist tendencies of American forms of magic, or “fetishistic 
oversimplications” as he calls them, he “sympathizes with his characters’ inchoate 
mysticism, as his typically mysterious, even magical endings suggest” (2).  
In a general way, Osteen has rightly noted DeLillo’s inclinations towards the 
spiritual dimension without deeper analysis of his specific stance. Osteen’s focus is 
ultimately on how American culture creates both dread as well as magic. My 
emphasis lies in DeLillo’s perspective on these mystical experiences, how he 
negotiates space for belief in a cynical world. Furthermore, while Osteen traces the 
characters’ spiritual needs to the frustrations and terrors of American culture and 
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society, I would like to postulate that the need for spiritual recovery also stems from 
immanent melancholia and existential loss.  
Critic Jesse Kavadlo examines how DeLillo presents postmodern market 
conditions in order to critique them; the texts hence counter the world they set up, 
balancing its “amoral, unfeeling qualities … with its opposite: belief” (12). Kavadlo 
argues that DeLillo’s fiction offers “a balancing moral corrective against the 
conditions that it describes” (4). While he notes that “DeLillo describes a world of 
solipsism and dessicated spirituality, a place rife with rejection of belief in favour of 
confused cerebral pursuits and false idols, of casually rampant faithlessness and 
unexamined pessimism” (4), Kavadlo contends that DeLillo presents despair and 
spiritual crisis in order to emphasize the need for redemption. That is, DeLillo’s 
fiction “ultimately suggests the need, and desire, for belief” (10; italics original). I 
concur with Kavadlo’s general argument that DeLillo’s fiction evidences belief, but 
wish to focus on the struggle between belief and scepticism in his texts, how belief 
can be negotiated within a space of cynicism. Kavadlo claims that the sceptical 
conditions described in DeLillo’s texts are negated by the writer’s actual belief. 
However, this thesis argues that the relationship between scepticism and belief is 
more complex than that, and DeLillo cannot be completely wrenched from 
scepticism. I will also examine the different means through which belief can be 
inferred from DeLillo’s fiction. 
This thesis aims to reconcile the two dominant critical perspectives on DeLillo 
– one which locates him as a postmodern sceptic who interrogates transcendent 
reality in order to cast doubt on its validity, and the other which sees him harking 
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back to an older metaphysics. The third possibility is a perfect, uniform balance 
between the two. While DeLillo may conjure scenes of fragmentation, disorder, and 
loss of meaning often associated with postmodern culture, there is nevertheless great 
critical resistance to reading his texts as hallmarks of disbelief and cynicism towards 
spirituality. A close study of his double-coded parodic voice, his resacralizing 
tendencies, and the sense of melancholia in his texts would surface these resistances 
and reveal how DeLillo’s texts ultimately betray belief despite scepticism. The sense 
of the loss of God reveals the continuing presence of belief. The chapters that follow 
would each elaborate on a theme or motif which is significant in illustrating DeLillo’s 
affirmation of spirituality in postmodernity. 
 The first chapter examines the double-coded nature of DeLillo’s use of parody 
with particular reference to Linda Hutcheon’s notion of parody as being both critical 
and affirmative. It argues that scepticism acts as a façade for belief in DeLillo’s 
narratives. Chapter 2 examines DeLillo’s use of irony to show that while he critiques 
aspects of new religious movements, he also affirms the need for faith and belief. 
Scepticism is important, but the human intellect alone is incapable of comprehending 
the transcendent. Chapter 3 examines DeLillo’s literary melancholia (including 
melancholic scepticism), focusing on melancholia that specifically stems from 
spiritual disappointment. Drawing on psychoanalytic descriptions of melancholia by 
Freud and Kristeva, I argue that melancholia in DeLillo’s characters points to their 
loss of fundamental existential wholeness. Spiritual longing is hence indicative of 
belief in a transcendent. Their aestheticization of melancholia also indicates an 
attempt at redemption through art, in order to console or compensate for the loss. 
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However, in DeLillo’s fiction, aesthetics is unable to provide a permanent coherence 
to human life, and hence it ultimately fails to address the loss that still haunts.  
 Hence I am not only concerned with whether DeLillo’s texts evidence belief 
or not, but also how belief can be inferred from texts. DeLillo’s textual scepticism 
(which has been picked up by critics) belies belief and melancholic longings. His 
narratives dramatize the struggle between faith and scepticism, and belief exists 
despite rife cynicism. How DeLillo negotiates faith in the space of unbelief, and how 
he treads the difficult boundary between the two elements, are the intriguing 

















CHAPTER 1:  
WHITE NOISE AND UNDERWORLD: DUALISM IN PARODY 
 
I know, I know. Parody. It might be fun, if it were not so melancholy in its 
aristocratic nihilism. (Mann 241) 
 
 DeLillo’s exuberant comic energy, so vital to his fiction, is often perceived to 
be subversive of institutions, value systems, and ideologies. Critic Frank Lentricchia 
defines DeLillo’s style as “terrific comedy” (“Introduction” 1) that relentlessly 
critiques capitalist consumer culture and “move[s] readers to the view that the shape 
and fate of their culture dictates the shape and fate of the self” (“Introduction” 1). 
That is, DeLillo’s humour draws attention to how social and cultural forces are 
directly responsible for the construction of the self. While Lentricchia views the 
protagonist of White Noise, Jack Gladney, as possessing a “mordantly styled humour” 
which critiques systems and transcendent experiences, he acknowledges that there is 
“something else in the voice, not easy to define because in books of this sort we don’t 
expect domestic commitment or a sense of wonder on behalf of the culture’s binding 
power” (“Tales” 112; italics mine). This other quality in DeLillo’s tone can be heard 
behind his dominant voice of scepticism to ironically affirm that which is being 
critiqued. For Lentricchia, this residual affirmation is merely the consequence of a 
Hobson’s choice presented by the text – to either participate in the absurd rituals of 
capitalism, or immerse oneself in the aura of totalitarian leaders (like character Jack 
Gladney’s fascination with Adolf Hitler in the novel White Noise). Both options 
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potentially offer one a community based on awe, but Lentricchia considers 
totalitarianism the morally darker alternative, and hence the corollary textual 
alignment with the resacralization of postmodern culture. I argue, however, that the 
sense of affirmation can be attributed to the double-codedness of DeLillo’s parody 
and how it betrays his belief in a transcendent. DeLillo’s use of parody is not 
necessarily limited to mocking assaults on systems and values. Rather, DeLillo is 
both critical, and affirmative, of the spiritualities which he parodies. The parodic 
juxtaposition of the comic and the serious can be an ambivalent mode of representing 
spirituality in DeLillo’s fiction. DeLillo seems to situate himself in the uncertain 
grounds between scepticism and belief, wedged between empathy and critique. 
Through close analysis of White Noise and Underworld, we will see how DeLillo’s 
parodic voice operates as a double-edged sword in his narratives. Two main 
theoretical frameworks will be employed: critic Linda Hutcheon’s notion of parody as 
dualistic will be examined first, followed by the Freudian view of jokes as containing 
hidden meanings, in the later part of this chapter. 
 It is commonly believed that parody establishes points of contrast between 
two texts, for the purpose of critique, mockery, or ridicule. The two texts hence exist 
in opposition to each other. However, Hutcheon argues for its “complex textual 
intentionality” (Parody 15) which should not be limited to mock imitation but which 
can also encompass a spectrum ranging from ironic playfulness to scornful 
denigration. 15 Parody often occurs with satire,16 but Hutcheon puts forth an 
                                                 
15 Hutcheon claims that while there is no trans-historical definition for parody, there are some elements 
common to all parodic forms. 
16 In order to distinguish between parody and satire, it is useful here to refer to literary critic Ziva Ben-
Porat’s definitions, also quoted by Hutcheon in A Theory of Parody. Parody is an “alleged 
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alternative view of parody by pointing out its duality. It is useful to quote Hutcheon 
here: “Parody, then, in its ironic “trans-contextualization” and inversion, is repetition 
with difference. A critical distance is implied between the backgrounded text being 
parodied and the new incorporating work, a distance usually signalled by irony. But 
this irony can be playful as well as belittling; it can be critically constructive as well 
as destructive” (Parody 32). There are two important implications that follow from 
Hutcheon’s definition of parody: firstly, the parodic commentary is not restricted 
solely to the mockery of the backgrounded text, but takes on varying shades of 
meanings; secondly, parody does not mean a total or outright rejection of the text 
being parodied – in fact, there is implicit affirmation, or even celebration, of it. Like 
irony, parody is both inclusive and exclusive. Hutcheon reiterates these ideas 
elsewhere in her writings: “parody is doubly coded in political terms: it both 
legitimizes and subverts that which it parodies” (Politics 101). In other words, parody 
“may indeed be complicitous with the values it inscribes as well as subverts, but the 
subversion is still there” (Politics 106). Hence, there is difference from the past, yet 
continuity as well.17  
                                                                                                                                           
representation, usually comic, of a literary text or other artistic object – i.e. a representation of a 
‘modelled reality,’ which is itself already a particular representation of an original ‘reality.’ The 
parodic representations expose the model’s conventions and lay bare its devices through the 
coexistence of the two codes in the same message” (247). Satire is a “critical representation, always 
comic and often caricatural, of ‘non-modelled reality,’ i.e. of the real objects (their reality may be 
mythical or hypothetical) which the receiver reconstructs as the referents of the message. The satirized 
original ‘reality’ may include mores, attitudes, types, social structures, prejudices, and the like” (247-
8). 
17 Without this affirmative quality, irony causes one to be politically unengaged and inept. Historian 
Hayden White elucidates a similar idea: “As the basis of a world view, irony tends to dissolve all belief 
in the possibility of positive political actions. In its apprehension of the essential folly or absurdity of 
the human condition, it tends to engender belief in the ‘madness’ of civilization itself and to inspire a 
Mandarin-like disdain for those seeking to grasp the nature of social reality” (38). Total “incredulity 
towards metanarratives” leads to constant struggle, defensiveness, and ultimately, isolation. Rather 
than this, the co-existence of critique with symp athy allows communion with others to become a 
reality. 
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 The Janus-faced nature of parody means that our reading of DeLillo’s 
representations of spirituality should not just focus on the critical elements, but 
extend beyond them to discern his affirmation of the very object of his critique. The 
dual perspectives of critique and sympathy can be reconciled, not necessarily 
mutually negating; otherwise, we would be left only with a reading of DeLillo’s texts 
as undecided about the validity of spiritual experiences.  
 
The Sacred in the Secular   
 DeLillo’s parodies of spirituality in White Noise suggest his belief in the 
transcendent despite his comic façade. In the words of Jack Gladney in White Noise: 
“The world is full of abandoned meanings. In the commonplace I find unexpected 
themes and intensities” (184). Although he is referring specifically to how the toxic 
cloud, a menacing force that threatens one’s sense of security, can surprisingly 
assume a religious quality, his notion of the “commonplace” can also be applied to re-
discovering the spiritual in the quotidian. Sociologist David Lyon succinctly observes 
that “the sacred may in one sense be reduced, in another relocated, in a third 
redefined” (84). He argues that though the grand narratives of the Enlightenment are 
in demise, the current narratives of the sacred are “much more fluid, malleable, and 
personalized” (85). Hence, in the postmodern world, the religious can no longer be 
contained solely within institutional structures, but also includes the unpredictable 
and the fluid. Mundane objects take on a mysterious and metaphysical quality. In 
Underworld, the light towers are mysteriously transformed to become the sources of 
an “unknown energy” (19), illuminating the players and the field with the atavistic 
 25 
“glow of first-time things” (20). In White Noise, Jack’s palms are to him a 
“cosmology against the void” (243), alluding to the divining of one’s life through 
palmistry. The resacralization of ordinary objects may not always be affirmed by 
DeLillo, but he does use the parodic device to show his interest in certain notions of 
spirituality. 
 Jack’s conception of the divine does not derive from institutionalized religion, 
but from his observation of life’s ordinary ritual of sleeping: “Watching children 
sleep makes me feel devout, part of a spiritual system. It is the closest I can come to 
God” (White Noise 147). This is Jack’s act of worship, the “secular equivalent” 
(White Noise 147) of mystical worship amidst the church’s architectural grandeur. 
Sleeping children evoke a sense of innocence, vulnerability, and surrender to larger 
forces beyond the self:  
In those soft warm faces was a quality of trust so absolute and pure 
that I did not want to think it might be misplaced. There must be 
something, somewhere, large and grand and redoubtable enough to 
justify this shining reliance and implicit belief. A feeling of desperate 
piety swept over me. It was cosmic in nature, full of yearnings and 
reachings. It spoke of vast distances, awesome but subtle forces. 
(White Noise 154)  
Here, Jack affirms the notion of faith. He associates God with peace, refuge, and 
omnipotence; yet he also sees Him as being concealed from man. In parodying 
institutionalized religious experience, Jack does not renounce it but instead endorses 
the encounter with the transcendent; the difference lies in the means of accessing 
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God. It is definitely possible to dismiss this assertion of belief as that of a weak-
willed man capitulating to his emotions, or the quiet desperation of a man who, 
bearing the death sentence meted out by the Nyodene cloud, is eager to cling to any 
means of salvation: “I was ready to search anywhere for signs and hints, intimations 
of old comfort” (White Noise 154). Nevertheless, DeLillo’s language here reflects the 
writer’s empathy for, and identification with, Jack’s very real hopes and fears. This 
can be contrasted with DeLillo’s representation of the tabloids as reflective of the 
necessity of “inventing hope” (White Noise 147). Humbled by mass belief in the 
afterlife and reincarnation, Jack capitulates – he desires to believe. The novel’s very 
ironic and parodic conclusion also follows this theme of man’s need for hope: 
“Everything we need that is not food or love is here in the tabloid racks. The tales of 
the supernatural and the extraterrestrial” (White Noise 326).18 The focus here is not so 
much on whether tabloid accounts of the spiritual are “true” or not, but how they 
provide a source of hope. 
 Jack’s German teacher Howard Dunlop embodies the diversification and 
openness of postmodern spirituality. Described as “querulous” (White Noise 54) and 
complacent, he bears the marks of a Pharisaic character: “It was important for him to 
believe that he’d spent his life among people who kept missing the point” (White 
Noise 54). Marked by emotional extremes, his recount of how he discovered 
meteorology is a parody of the typical conversion testimony: “My mother’s death had 
a terrible impact on me. I collapsed totally, lost my faith in God. I was inconsolable, 
withdrew completely into myself. Then one day by chance I saw a weather report on 
                                                 
18 Osteen argues that the novel’s conclusion lacks authorial comment, hence showing DeLillo’s 
neutrality, while Bonca finds it “generous-spirited” (40). 
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TV […] I realized weather was something I’d been looking for all my life. It brought 
me a sense of peace and security I’d never experienced” (White Noise 55). This short 
narrative conforms to the characteristic structure of a conversion testimony: life 
before conversion and the event which disturbs the pattern; the encounter with the 
life-transforming entity; and how life has changed after conversion. Dunlop has, 
however, replaced God (the usual agent of change) with a banal topic in daily 
conversations – weather! DeLillo’s parody here pokes fun at religious testimonies of 
conversion by the supernatural. Yet the joke is also on Dunlop who settles for less in 
choosing to commit himself to the weather (which offers only temporary relief) 
instead of God. DeLillo is also being serious about man’s desire for redemption, 
whatever form the encounter with the transcendent may take. Dunlop saw “hunger, a 
compelling need” (White Noise 56) in the eyes of those who came to hear his lectures 
on meteorology, people from all vocations and walks of life. 
 The boundaries of what can be considered sacred have shifted to encompass 
the marginalized, expelled, or despised. This is most clearly seen in Underworld 
where DeLillo plays up ambiguities much more than in White Noise where his 
primary tone is that of ridicule. Underworld’s character Nick Shay considers waste “a 
religious thing. We entomb waste with a sense of reverence and dread. It is necessary 
to respect what we discard” (88). In elevating waste to the status of religion, Nick 
Shay signals a change in perception towards what is commonly believed to be useless 
or taboo. In White Noise, the Nyodene D. cloud evokes ambivalent emotions in the 
spectators: “Our fear was accompanied by a sense of awe that bordered on the 
religious” (127) – the tension between terror and wonder which is also present in 
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man’s worship of the divine. Here is a toxic cloud that has its origins as chemicals in 
the laboratory, transformed into a perverse spectacle inspiring “outlandish 
wonderment” (White Noise 127). The parody stems from the reverential sentiments 
accorded to a man-made event perceived as a “cosmic force, so much larger than 
yourself” (White Noise 127). Even as DeLillo jokes about the veneration towards the 
toxic cloud (critiquing the way man’s creations turn into something monstrous and 
beyond his control), he affirms the awe that arises from the encounter with the 
sublime, and the part of man which instinctively worships the unknown. A similar 
reading can be made of DeLillo’s treatment of the ultra-brilliant sunsets which have 
resulted from the toxic cloud dispersion: “Certainly there is awe, it is all awe, it 
transcends previous categories of awe” (White Noise 324). 
 
Consumerism and Spirituality 
 Consumerism, a defining aspect of market capitalism and often associated 
with a late stage in modernity, has affected the manner in which social and cultural 
identities are being constructed. As sociologist Mike Featherstone puts it: “the sacred 
is able to sustain itself outside of organized religion within consumer culture” (126). 
British sociologist Zygmunt Bauman observes that not only is the experience of 
religious ecstasy and transcendence no longer restricted to a privileged few with 
special access to it, being available to anyone now, it can also occur in non-religious 
contexts, “relocated as the product of a life devoted to the art of consumer self-
indulgence” (70). There are two essential aspects: a commodity becoming a sacred 
object; and spirituality as a consumerist process.  
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Sociologist Emile Durkheim asserts the possibility of every object becoming 
sacred, including commodities (215). Regardless of their seeming triviality or 
inconsequentiality, they take on a symbolic significance which generates meaning 
associated with the transcendental. In DeLillo’s fiction, cultural commodities like an 
automobile or a neon billboard can actually possess a symbolic charge which elevates 
them to the status of a sacred article, even if the event is only ephemeral. In “The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” German critic and philosopher 
Walter Benjamin argues that aura, in its fetishizing of origin, shrouds the work of art 
in its ritual function (67). He affirms the destruction of the aura of high-culture art by 
technologies of mass reproduction. Aura hence migrates from high culture to mass 
culture; according to Benjamin, mechanical reproduction could be used to construct 
aura in mass culture that would aestheticize the political (63).19 Through his 
affirmation of the views of his characters, DeLillo comes across as believing in 
supernatural workings behind and through a seemingly man-made event.  
The consumerist experience is akin to a spiritual experience for Jack and 
Babette who discover wholeness and fulfilment in the substantiality and tangibility of 
their purchases in the supermarket: “in the sense of replenishment we felt, the sense 
of well-being, the security and contentment these products brought to some snug 
home in our souls – it seemed we had achieved a fullness of being” (White Noise 20). 
This is the language of spiritual rejuvenation transplanted to the context of grocery 
shopping. While it parodies the spiritual quest for completeness, it also implicitly 
acknowledges that these are genuine human needs. While it expresses the 
                                                 
19 According to Benjamin, this is what Fascism does, and the antidote he recommends is to politicize 
art. 
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impossibility of consumer goods effectively meeting the spiritual needs of the human 
soul (Jack and Babette remain distraught, haunted, lost, and petrified by the reality of 
death), it seems that consumerism does have an important role to play in the satiation 
of those needs, whether as a substitute for more “authentic” forms of spirituality, or in 
actually becoming a form of spirituality in itself. Shopping as a spiritual event is both 
critiqued and affirmed. The character Murray Jay Siskind, a professor of popular 
culture, transposes The Tibetan Book of the Dead to the American context of the 
supermarket.20 The Tibetan Book presents the death experience as a “bardo state” (36) 
– an “interval of suspension” (1) between death and rebirth – during which one hears 
a roar “like a thousand thunderclaps” and sees potentially intimidating “lights and 
rays” (41). These sensations are the projections of man. The Tibetan Book is an 
instructive text on how to be liberated from the deceptions which exist both in life 
and in death; in other words, how to attain enlightenment (Tibetan xi). In the 
supermarket, one is also surrounded by lights and white noise (random noise made by 
machines that has a uniform frequency spectrum, dispelling the anxiety of total 
silence). Jack Gladney’s description of white noise as “a dull and unlocatable roar, as 
of some form of swarming life just outside the range of human apprehension” (White 
Noise 36) draws a parallel between it and the possibility of an invisible reality beyond 
man’s perceptive powers. Murray sees the supermarket as a “gateway or pathway” 
(White Noise 37). In his paralleling of shopping and spirituality, DeLillo is being 
characteristically ironic – while a Tibetan Buddhist could sincerely say that 
consumerism is born out of the fear of the void, one cannot neatly equate the state of 
                                                 
20 One of the working titles of the novel was The American Book of the Dead, a parody of the Tibetan 
version. 
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waiting for rebirth with the gratification of base appetites in the supermarket. Grocery 
shopping does not lead one to a reincarnated state. Yet, while DeLillo plays with 
Tibetan notions of death, he does not critique their anachronism or esoterism. Instead, 
his critique is of how consumerism falsely imitates spiritual experiences. The parody 
is critiqued, not that which is inadvertently parodied. Osteen observes that 
“consuming attaches persons to the things whose reproducibility betokens 
immortality” (171), and that the consumer becomes a unit in the capitalist system. If 
the bardo state is a gap between a past situation and a future which has yet to 
materialize, it can be asked what kind of future consumerism bestows on its subject as 
he passes through the counter, and whether it is necessarily a more enlightened state. 
The Tibetan bardo offers the hope of redemption through enlightenment, but there is 
no such possibility in the supermarket. In fact, the supermarket further entangles 
one’s roots in the material world through the deceptive notion that commodities 
satisfy. This scene sheds light on how to read an earlier scene in which Murray sees 
tourism as akin to a spiritual experience in its creation of aura and communion (White 
Noise 12) – again, there is both critique and affirmation of spirituality.  
 In the scene in which Steffie mutters a car name in her sleep, DeLillo narrates 
a genuine transcendent event, contrary to what critics have claimed.21 Jack 
reconstructs Steffie’s repetition of “Toyota Celica” by situating it within a spiritual 
discourse, hence deepening the irony: “The utterance was beautiful and mysterious, 
gold-shot with looming wonder. It was like the name of an ancient power in the sky, 
tablet-carved in cuneiform. It made me feel that something hovered” (White Noise 
                                                 
21 Maltby interprets this scene as an instance of cultural regeneration. On the other hand, Saltzman sees 
it as DeLillo’s satirical comment on the insidious nature of consumerism and media technology, “at 
once as synthetic and as deadly as Nyodene D” (“Figure”).  
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155). Is DeLillo mocking Jack for his naivety and easy succumbing to emotions? I 
argue not. Jack’s self- reflexive rationalization immediately after the above remarks 
show that he still retains his capacity to reason. It is just that despite logic, he is 
enchanted by the spiritual and hence he does not deny these moments of absolute 
transcendence. He recognizes the absurdity of recovering “a meaning, a presence” in 
these “near-nonsense words,” yet admits that “[w]hatever its source, the utterance 
struck me with the impact of a moment of splendid transcendence” (White Noise 
155). This scene can be related to DeLillo’s representation of glossolalia which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. It is not an issue of arriving at a considered decision 
about the spiritual, but rather being receptive to its manifestations. DeLillo’s tone 
here is not critical, but pensive, generous, and sympathetic towards Jack. This can be 
seen not only in textual evidence of Jack’s self-awareness, but also in the sense of 
beauty conjured by DeLillo’s description of Jack’s experience of “splendid 
transcendence” (White Noise 155) here. 
Similarly, in Underworld, when a symbol of consumerism attains a mystical 
and mythical quality, DeLillo’s treatment of it suggests his belief in the transcendent 
despite his doubts. A Minute Maid billboard is compared to medieval church 
architecture in its intricate details and workmanship: “each fleck embellished with the 
finicky rigor of some precisionist painting” (Underworld 820). The gathering of the 
crowd at the sighting of Esmeralda’s vision can be seen as an example of what 
Durkheim calls collective “effervescence” (220). The twelve-year-old victim of a 
brutal rape and murder in the Bronx, Esmeralda’s vision still manages to evoke 
feelings of worship and awe. Through two nun characters, Sisters Alma Edgar and 
 33 
Grace Fahey, DeLillo explores the possible reasons for rejecting or accepting the 
vision. Sister Grace considers the supposed vision of Esmeralda “the worst kind of 
tabloid superstition” (Underworld 819): “It’s how the news becomes so powerful it 
doesn’t need TV or newspapers. It exists in people’s perceptions. It’s something they 
invent, strong enough to seem real” (Underworld 819). To Grace, the miracle is a 
purely subjective event with no basis in the “real” world. Edgar, on the other hand, 
desires to personally verify the authenticity of the vision. She chides Grace for 
restricting visions to the poor people, and through her insistence on the possibility of 
genuine faith, she resists Grace’s notion of media exploitation of the event. 
Employing the materialist and imaginative modes of perception, Grace also explains 
away Esmeralda’s vision as a “trick of light” (Underworld 821), a “technical flaw that 
causes the image underneath, the image from the papered-over ad to show through the 
current ad” (Underworld 822). Grace eventually is denied the ecstasy which Edgar 
experiences as an “angelus of clearest joy,” “singing of things outside the known 
deliriums” (Underworld 822). The crowd which gathers to witness the apparition is 
described to have undergone an intense religious experience: “a gasp that shoots into 
sobs and moans and the cry of some unnameable painful elation” (Underworld 821). 
All these conform to Durkheim’s description of effervescence – the experience of 
collective religious intensity: “The vital energies become hyper-excited, the passions 
more intense, the sensations more powerful” (424). Grace’s scepticism is a critique of 
Edgar’s black-and-white perception of the world, yet DeLillo also affirms the faith of 
the old world nun that allows her access to a valuable transcendent experience. 
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 There is another sense in which consumerism can be seen as having impacted 
spirituality. As Lyon puts it:  
  If the new media yield fragments of former systems as images and  
  symbols, then consumer processes are implicated in reassembling  
these fragments into a constantly shifting pattern, customized by and 
for the individual. This kind of process is also at work in religious 
identity-construction: how people make sense – or rather, make a life – 
religiously, at the ordinary, mundane, everyday level. (75).  
Postmodernity celebrates diversity; the centre cannot hold and has disintegrated into 
fragments which are all plausible, hence the concept of pastiche. This can be related 
to Lyon’s notion of the development of bricolage belief systems paralleling 
consumerist attitudes. This kind of syncretism is seen in the postmodern manner in 
which each individual selects from the range of spiritualities to form his own 
bricolage of beliefs. The novel presents characters who possess an eclectic mixture of 
beliefs, not centred but diffuse, much like how we shop for different commodities to 
meet our various needs. There is no unity or coherence of ideas, no criteria apart from 
self-satisfaction. Babette, the wife of protagonist Jack Gladney, teaches at a 
Congregational church and has no qualms about “mak[ing] references to yoga, kendo, 
trance-walking […] Sufi dervishes, Sherpa mountaineers” (White Noise 27). While 
trying to cure herself of her fear of death, she turned not only to science, but also a 
Sikh holy man and the occult (White Noise 192). DeLillo suggests that syncretism 
may be problematic through his satire of people who subscribe totally to syncretism 
and are receptive to all ideas, even when they contradict one another: “Nothing is 
 35 
foreign, nothing too remote to apply. I am always surprised at their acceptance and 
trust, the sweetness of their belief” (White Noise 27). DeLillo sees this as the “end of 
scepticism” (White Noise 27); for him, not all beliefs are plausible, and scepticism is 
necessary. The Lyotardian “incredulity towards metanarratives” may enable 
numerous micronarratives, but for DeLillo, there needs to be scepticism towards the 
little narratives as well. 
 
Comedy of the Sisters  
 The motif of unbelieving nuns appears in both White Noise and Underworld, 
but it is in the later novel that it becomes more fully developed. Both novels draw on 
stereotypes of nuns as steadfast in their faith, living a generally disciplined and sober 
life, reclusive, uncomfortable about sexuality, unquestioning, and unthinking – in 
other words, not quite human like everyone else. The nuns in White Noise appear only 
towards the end of the novel when Jack has a bullet wound treated by a nun. Jack 
experiences a moment of being “sentimentally refreshed” (White Noise 317) as he 
approves of the optimism in the picture of President Jack Kennedy holding hands 
with Pope John XXIII in heaven: “Why shouldn’t we all meet, as in some epic of 
protean gods and ordinary people, aloft, well- formed, shining?” (White Noise 317). 
Jack moves from this seeming bliss, to rude shock, anxiety, frustration, bewilderment, 
denial, and finally, assertion of the relevance of spiritual belief. The nuns in White 
Noise reveal that their belief is an act – they embody “things no one else takes 
seriously” (318) so as to keep the machine of the world running smoothly on. In their 
view, an increasingly sceptical world heightens man’s need for belief, and they 
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perform a purely functional role, with no core of real spiritual faith. Jack’s reaction is 
horror and outright rejection, desiring that the nuns return to their traditional role as 
keepers of the faith. This scene is comic in its subversion of nun stereotypes and total 
reversal of roles – here, the supposed sceptic is pleading with the nuns (who are 
ironically the real sceptics) to believe. The parody works to fulfil our expectations of 
nuns up to a certain point, beyond which we suddenly find ourselves abandoned, 
stranded, having lost our navigational tools. That is the moment one realizes one’s 
need for figures of spiritual authority. While these disbelieving nuns may seem more 
progressive compared to traditional representations of nuns, the reader senses 
DeLillo’s longing to return to faith in his emotional identification with Jack. DeLillo 
critiques how man has detached and isolated belief from the more pragmatic aspects 
of their lives, and relegated to a minority the responsibility to believe. 
 Sisters Edgar and Grace in Underworld are the complex and fascinating 
subjects of DeLillo’s parody. In her Catholic nun attire (complete with habit, veil, 
wimple, and crucifix), Sister Edgar is described by another character Albert Bronzini 
as “[a]nciently familiar, a figure from the land of the past” (Underworld 231). He 
compares her to “a detail lifted from a painting by some sixteenth-century master” 
(Underworld 232), augmenting a sense of her anachronism, her straddling between 
past and present. The Spartan bareness of her “blade face and bony hands” and “spare 
frame” (Underworld 231) embodies characteristics of quintessential religious life – 
ascetism and renunciation of the secular. They also earn her the unflattering nickname 
of “Sister Skelly Bone” amongst the lost Bronx children whom she teaches. She is 
portrayed as a stern disciplinarian who intimidates and controls the children through 
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physical violence – for instance, her banging of a child’s head against the blackboard 
when he innocuously substitutes Tarzan and Jane for Adam and Eve. DeLillo 
implicitly criticizes Sister Edgar for her denial of sexuality when she unreasonably 
commands a girl to remove her breasts (Underworld 718). However, this is the same 
nun who indulges in details of Hollywood stars. Sister Edgar is a product of a 
restrictive religious system which denies the devotee a full life, trapping her in a 
backward frame of mind. She represents an obsession gone wrong. There is no 
marriage of aesthetics and ecstasy in her religion, causing Edgar to develop a 
subterranean self, almost like schizophrenia (she can only secretly let loose her 
repressed fleshly desires for beauty). The presence of suppressed desires, according to 
critic Rebecca Sullivan, is a common trope in narratives about nuns. Sister Edgar is a 
conflation of various nun stereotypes through which DeLillo presents a critique of old 
world nuns as obsolete, displaced, irrelevant, naive, sanctimonious, and repressed. 
 However, DeLillo also locates Sister Edgar at a critical distance from 
stereotypical representations of nuns by portraying her as a body of ambivalence, 
pain, and inner tensions. Undergoing a dark night of the soul, she is defined by self-
contradiction and questions the faith on which she has based her entire life and self-
construction. The novel emphasizes Sister Edgar’s pathologic anxiety; in her 
obsession with hygiene, she exhibits a paranoia which is tragically comical in its 
futile “infinite regression” (Underworld 251): “How can the hands be clean if the 
soap is not? … But if you clean the soap with bleach, what do you clean the bleach 
bottle with? If you use scouring powder on the bleach bottle, how do you clean the 
box of Ajax? … And the questions turn inward forever” (Underworld 237-8). This 
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condition can be interpreted in various ways. Sister Edgar being a “cold war nun” 
(Underworld 245), her extremity towards pathogens could be a parallel of the Cold 
War fear, paranoia, and suspicion of the other. In this sense, she is linked to J. Edgar 
Hoover.22 She wears latex gloves in order to protect herself, but she remains conflict-
ridden as she views the gloves as a product of modern science, “sinfully complicit 
with some process she only half understood, the force in the world, the array of 
systems that displaces religious faith with paranoia” (Underworld 241). Hence, Sister 
Edgar’s neurosis can also be a metaphor for how the religious preoccupation with 
eliminating sin can possibly go awry when taken to its extreme, just like the Cold 
War extremism to rid the world of communism. The image is also that of religion in a 
state of sickness, unable to extricate itself from the debilitating effects of sin. Sister 
Edgar’s attitude towards graffiti artist Ismael Muñoz is not one of compassion, but 
unfounded insistence on his infection by the AIDS virus. In displaying more concern 
about physical corruption rather than the moral or spiritual redemption of man, Sister 
Edgar represents a distorted Catholic value system. Hers is a faith in demise as she 
capitulates to paranoia. In an epiphanic moment at the novel’s end, Edgar horrifyingly 
recognizes her rejection of the belief system to which she has given all her life: 
She sees the human heart exposed like a pig’s muscle on a slab. That’s 
the only thing she sees. She believes she is falling into crisis, 
beginning to think it is possible that all creation is a spurt of blank 
matter that chances to make an emerald planet here, a dead star there, 
with random waste between. The serenity of immense design is 
missing from her life, authorship and moral form […] It is not a 
                                                 
22 The relationship between Sister Edgar and J. Edgar Hoover will be analyzed later in this section. 
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question of disbelief. There is another kind of belief, a second force, 
insecure, untrusting, a faith that is spring-fed by the things we fear in 
the night, and she thinks she is succumbing. (817) 
Order is displaced by chaos, paranoia, and terror – the utter materialist is ironically 
and interestingly construed by her as a form of counter-faith. Sister Edgar is 
constituted of a religious exterior without the enlivening and vitalizing core of 
genuine faith. Matt Shay, one of her former students, considers her “all cloth. She was 
a wall of laundered cloth” (Underworld 720), vested with the appearance of moral 
authority, but actually without its essence. The Baltimore Catechism’s question-and-
answer system, which has been the “lucid music of her life” (Underworld 815), is no 
longer effective in keeping out the doubts and fears which assail her. Cold War 
paranoia has seeped into religion and “[a]ll terror is local now” (Underworld 816).  
DeLillo documents the disintegration of Sister Edgar and her religious faith. 
On the one hand, his parody presents a critique of simplistic representations of nuns 
as unquestioning followers of God. However, it is also a satire on how a sin-obsessed 
and repressive Catholicism is capable of generating intense anxieties and fears within 
an individual. Through Sister Edgar, DeLillo critiques Western religion and thought 
which have their roots in Hellenistic philosophy, specifically rationalism, reason, and 
humanism.23 The charges that DeLillo poses against them are that they have either 
deformed or degenerated into a kind of intellectual paranoia so celebrated by some 
forms of postmodernism, and that they have failed to meet fundamental human needs 
                                                 
23 Historian Warren Hollister's work masterfully summarizes the forces in a Hellenized World (330 
BCE - 500 CE) which impacted a Hellenized Judaism and a Hellenized Christianity; forces which were 
to prepare the Western World for a new relig ion, Christianity.  
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and are hence ineffectual. The slow erosion of Sister Edgar’s faith is a critique of how 
religion fails to withstand the assault of historical forces. She lacks the “insistence on 
faith and trust” which is the “only force available against the power of doubt” 
(Underworld 31). DeLillo critiques religion without faith, rejecting its implicit 
hypocrisy. Eventually, Sister Edgar has to cling on to the vision of Esmeralda to 
salvage the last vestige of her faith.  
 In a Dantean move, DeLillo puts Sister Edgar (after her death) not in biblical 
heaven, but imprisons her in cyberspace where a diversity of voices exists in anarchic 
freedom and democracy. In this sense, cyberspace can be considered the epitome of 
postmodernity. The cyberspace parody of heaven is a “world without end, amen” 
(Underworld 825), one which transcends the limits of time and space. This is also 
Sister Edgar’s ultimate nightmare as she would then be connected to everything, 
exposed to every form of contamination. She is in the “grip of systems” (Underworld 
825), connected intrinsically to elements of the H-bomb home page. By asserting that 
Sister Edgar’s faith is rejuvenated through the Esmeralda vision and her resurrection 
in cyberspace, critics Irving Malin and Joseph Dewey could be overly optimistic 
about Edgar’s transcendent experiences, ignoring the parodic undertones in the text. 
Without a pragmatic spiritual faith, Sister Edgar has been reduced to an icon on a 
website, occurring at the same level as weapons and violence. DeLillo paints a quasi-
religious quality here of the power of the bomb: “its dripping christblood colours, 
solar golds and reds” and the “power of false faith, the faith of paranoia” 
(Underworld 825; italics mine). In cyberspace, ideas are appropriated, reassembled, 
creating different associations. In sociologist Manuel Castells’ words, “all wonders 
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are on-line and can be combined into self-constructed image-worlds” (375). DeLillo 
describes Sister Edgar’s religious ecstasy in “The jewels roll out of her eyes and she 
sees God” only to dramatically disappoint us in the subsequent disclaimer: “No, wait, 
sorry. It is a Soviet bomb she sees” (Underworld 826). Is there a spiritual vision to 
which Sister Edgar is blind, the marriage of opposites in which God is the Soviet 
bomb? What is implied is Sister Edgar’s naivety and flawed vision.  
There is comedy and critique in the parody which appears to be highly 
sceptical of traditional religion – the abode of God is replaced by electronic 
geography, and God is nowhere in view. Sister Edgar’s sojourn in cyberspace can be 
read as an allegory of religion’s dispossession of authority in a postmodern, 
postindustrial world. She loses any aura she might have had before she became an 
image on the Net, and is subjected to de-differentiation – she is not more special than 
any other icon on the screen. In a media-saturated society, there is a proliferation of 
images and symbols; the overproduction of these signifiers leads to uncertainty in 
reading any media text. Cultural theorist Jean Baudrillard’s version of mediated 
reality, known as the “hyperreal” (385), throws the traditionally stable relationship 
between the signifier and the signified into disarray. What remains is a disembodied 
world – the simulacrum which refers to no external reality but only to itself. What is 
sought is not meaning but spectacle. The boundary between reality and illusion 
becomes nebulous, hence destabilizing traditional notions of identity, space, and time. 
What if cyberspace is actually the “real” world?  
 However, in the light of the entire section, it is simplistic to read the 
cyberspace parody as just another exercise in scepticism, or DeLillo’s sacrilegious 
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attack on religion. Perhaps DeLillo is suggesting that there still remains an urgent and 
desperate human need for religion, but in order to fulfil this role, religion needs to re-
consider seriously how it can respond intelligently and effectively to historical events 
and threats to human existence. For DeLillo, insularity is no longer a viable or 
favourable option for religion. In linking Sister Edgar to Edgar Hoover, known as her 
“more or less kindred spirit” (Underworld 826), DeLillo draws a parallel between the 
FBI and the Catholic Church – they are connected and hence complicit in world 
events despite their seeming incongruity. 24 Each sheds light on how the other 
institution operates. Technology has transformed the world and religion needs to find 
new ways of coping with a brave new world in which everything is inter-connected. 
For French theorist Paul Virilio, virtual reality means that “orientation is no longer 
possible. We have lost our points of reference,” yet “the ironic outcome of this 
technoscientific development is a renewed need for the idea of God” (Wilson 45). 
Ultimately, man is not satisfied with a cyberspace heaven – there needs to be 
something more; the cyberspace narrative is hence self-reflexive in that it looks back 
with laughter at itself, aware of its own insubstantial and transitory nature. It is 
merely a parodic effect used by DeLillo to point to the need for a transcendent which 
can truly address the needs of the human soul.  
Sister Grace Fahey can be read as Edgar’s alter-ego. Pragmatic and positivist, 
with a can of Chemical Mace constantly at hand, she considers angels archaic, and 
                                                 
24 See Malin and Dewey for the character similarities between Sister Edgar and J. Edgar Hoover: their 
Manichean vision of the world; their obsession with pathogens; their detachment from others and 
withdrawal into a personal world of secret desires; their being haunted by death; the way they attempt 
to enforce order; and their inability to reconcile flesh and spirit. However, the two characters are, 
according to Malin and Dewey, polarities in that Sister Edgar recovers her faith eventually while 
Hoover has no access to a transcendent reality (25). I argue that they are more like variations on 
DeLillo’s theme of faithlessness – Hoover needs a fool-proof coffin and Alma goes to cyberspace 
instead of celestial heaven. 
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disapproves of graffiti artist Muñoz’s memorial angels. Grace could very well be a 
stereotype of the contemporary nun herself. It is to DeLillo’s credit that he recognizes 
and represents the impact that feminism and modernization have had on the 
Sisterhood. However, he shows her to be deficient in ways that the older nun is not. 
In their complementary relationship, DeLillo plays them off each other and ultimately 
shows Edgar and Grace to be both blind and enlightened in different aspects.  
Both try to better the lives of the street kids who are defenceless and helpless 
on their own, the poor, the misfits of society, and the outcasts; but their motivations 
are different. DeLillo’s sarcasm can be detected in his critique of Grace’s belief that 
“the proof of God’s creativity eddied from the fact that you could not surmise the life, 
even remotely, of his humblest shut-in” (Underworld 246). While the multi- faceted 
nature of life could testify to its creator’s imaginative powers, this kind of world view 
that considers economic poverty a sign of God’s creativity also reveals a denial of 
life’s sufferings, a highly sentimental way of reconciling the concept of a benevolent 
God with the imperfections of life, and religious bigotry. She lacks the capacity to 
empathize with another, yet she is the one who erupts in righteous hysteria and 
outrage when she encounters tourists in the Bronx. On the other hand, Edgar’s 
motivation is also ambivalent because it stems from her need to heal herself: “she saw 
herself, the fraidy child who must face the real terror of the streets to cure the linger 
of destruction inside her” (Underworld 248). In Sister Edgar’s view, Grace is “a 
soldier, a fighter for human worth” and she herself “basically a junior G-man, 
protecting a set of laws and prohibitions. She had a raven’s heart, small and obdurate” 
(Underworld 249). Yet Sister Edgar is drawn to romance: “the drama of the angels,” 
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“the terrible death” they signify, and the “danger” the graffiti artists have to undergo. 
There is mockery in saying that “inside the strew of rubble, she was a natural sight, 
she and the robed monks. What figures could be so timely, costumed for rats and 
plague” (Underworld 240), yet these religious figures identified with rottenness and 
diseases are also the only emblems of hope and redemption in the hellish realm of the 
Bronx. Edgar is “spindle-shanked,” “cinctured and veiled and would not know how to 
dress otherwise and would not be here at all if the children were healthy and the dogs 
middle-class” (Underworld 811). Despite DeLillo’s criticism of Edgar’s 
shortcomings, he recognizes that she fills a need in the Bronx community. Grace is 
the new nun who questions spiritual phenomena openly and relies on the rational 
mind, viewing the Esmeralda apparition with only scientific logic. She is the voice of 
scepticism – questioning, distrust of the senses, relating the event to human 
intervention and scientific reasoning, however she misses out on the ecstasy of faith, 
as has been shown earlier in this chapter. 
Sisters Edgar and Grace are hence presented as polarities, but DeLillo does 
not seem to demand that we choose between them. I am proposing that instead of 
reading the duality between the two Sisters as indecision, DeLillo may be suggesting 
a balance or convergence of the two perspectives which need not be mutually 
negating. Each perspective has its intrinsic limitations: while scepticism denies the 
possibility of the supernatural because of its insistence on questioning every idea, 
faith can also seem removed from the rational and the “real.” Rather, there needs to 
be a reconciliation of the two polarities for greater balance – a new conception of 
spiritual belief or response to the noumenal which takes into account the sceptical 
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view as well as the necessity of faith. Spiritual faith can be integrated with intellectual 
questioning. In establishing Sister Edgar as a parody of nun stereotypes (rather than 
offering any romanticized or idealized representation of nuns), DeLillo firstly 
critiques the rigidity and repression of traditional religious systems, and their 
suppression of human questioning. However, he also pokes fun at Edgar’s paranoia 
and disintegration, and implicitly affirms the need for spiritual faith and order. As a 
postmodern nun, energetic, flexible, dedicated, and socially-concerned, Grace is 
clearly a parody of old world nuns with her contemporary appearance and sceptical 
attitudes, but she too lacks faith. In their responses to Esmeralda’s vision – Edgar 
believing, Grace sceptical – DeLillo casts doubt on Edgar’s faith, yet it is this same 
faith he is calling for. Hence, the playing out of the dual codes in parody can be seen 
in how DeLillo treats Edgar and Grace with both critique and sympathy. DeLillo 
shows how Western spirituality has failed, and offers a critique of faithless religion, 
yet the double-coding of parody also reveals his desire for a fuller and more effective 
religion instead of a complete rejection of it. The nuns educate the children, supply 
provisions to the poor and needy, and supply Muñoz with information on car metal. 
However, Muñoz’s way appears to be more effective and relevant: he recognizes that 
the children may be better off without their parents; he brings in a TV; he is more in 
touch with the residents; he creates beauty in the wasteland. It is again the idea that 





Trawling the Subterranean Zone of Jokes 
 It can be seen by now that there is a quality about DeLillo’s jokes which is not 
merely cynicism, scepticism, or mockery – there is also affirmation of belief and 
faith. However, this affirmation is often elusive, not demonstrable; it persists only 
because it never quite gets laughed out of existence. In Jokes and Their Relation to 
the Unconscious, Freud postulates that jokes (besides dreams and slips) offer one way 
into the unconscious as they are indicative of repressed wishes. He conceives of 
jokes, the comic, and humour in terms of psychic economy and pleasure derived: 
“The pleasure in jokes arises from an economy in expenditure upon inhibition, the 
pleasure in the comic from an economy in expenditure upon ideation (upon cathexis) 
and the pleasure in humour from an economy in expenditure upon feeling” (Jokes 
236). A tendentious joke provides a means of satisfying a purpose while overcoming 
any external or internal obstacles put in the way of fulfilling that purpose. There is 
also pleasure derived from the removal of the need to suppress that purpose: “this 
yield of pleasure corresponds to the psychical expenditure that is saved” (Jokes 118; 
italics original). A psychoanalytic analysis of DeLillo’s parody can surface alternative 
meanings, revealing an underlying affirmation of the transcendent. DeLillo’s parody 
could be read as a defensive strategy against scepticism, a need to hide the sincerity 
of belief. His comic playfulness acts as a shield for his sobriety and sombreness, 
leading critics like McClure to observe a tension between the two elements. 
 In the light of Freud’s theories, DeLillo’s texts can be read as exhibiting either 
belief or the desire to believe, that the psychic barriers of scepticism and fear of 
criticism would not allow. Joking is a strategy to evade and espouse the revelation of 
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one’s belief or desire to believe, that one finds difficult to acknowledge. Through 
jokes, DeLillo’s characters overcome their inhibitions by means of the pleasure that 
can be gained from jokes (due to incongruity, recognition, and nonsense). They hence 
economize on inner tension, anxiety of belief, and the need to justify their faith. 
These sources of displeasure are transformed into sources of comic pleasure which 
perform the dual roles of concealing and revealing one’s desires, and Freud sees the 
creator of the joke as having succeeded “in submitting some hitherto unconquered 
emotions to the control of humour” (Jokes 232). Humour provides a psychic and 
emotional safety valve through which one can purge himself of anxieties, fears, and 
hostilities, through their transformation into pleasurable forms like dreams or art.25  
Despite their sceptical front, DeLillo’s texts remain unwilling to relinquish the 
evanescent or the unthinkable. The highly fascinating interplay between sincerity and 
comedy in DeLillo’s texts suggests belief despite strong scepticism. The lapses in 
DeLillo’s generally comic narratives indicate a freeing of emotions from repression, 
as can be seen in how Jack Gladney responds to Winnie Richards and Murray’s 
theories on overcoming the fear of death in White Noise. Winnie, a brilliant scientist 
in the novel, provides a logical analysis of how to alleviate the fear of death – by 
making death “less strange and un-referenced” (White Noise 229). However, she does 
not have the knowledge to actualize this, and hence it remains a theory, an abstraction 
which Jack finds utterly useless to him. As a foil to Winnie, Murray offers Jack 
several remedies to counteract his fear of death, all of which are couched in a sense of 
                                                 
25 On one level, Freudian notions of humour can be employed in an analysis of DeLillo’s characters. 
On another level, they can also be applied to DeLillo himself. However, the latter reading does not 
serve much purpose here since the former already suffices in establishing textual affirmation of 
spirituality. 
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playful irreverence; they are comic suggestions teasingly dished out in plates: either 
put your faith in technology, or focus on the afterlife (White Noise 286). Murray 
mocks the notion of an afterlife by calling it “a sweet and terribly touching idea” 
(White Noise 286). Jack counters his assertions with an almost earnest and sincere 
attitude: “Don’t I have to believe? Don’t I have to feel in my heart that there is 
something, genuinely, beyond this life, out there, looming, in the dark?” (White Noise 
286). DeLillo parodies Murray’s scepticism, detached comprehension, and flippant 
dismissal of various large notions, since Murray is ultimately committed to nothing. 
Jack is made to test out Murray’s idea of violence as a way of overcoming death. The 
result: it is a flop. DeLillo is not advocating blind belief – the mind should question, 
but epistemological limits have to be acknowledged, and what we do not know cannot 
be so easily dismissed. The example of Murray demonstrates how academic ideas can 
become bizarre and useless performances. 
 It is useful here to compare DeLillo with humorist Lenny Bruce whose 
irreverence is targeted at religion and the parochial attitude of religious people 
(Underworld 581, 630), besides treating other taboo subjects such as racial fears, 
sexual fantasies, Jewish-Christian tensions, and politics. DeLillo celebrates Bruce’s 
black humour and satirical sense: “there was an odd turn of truth, a sense of 
unleashing perhaps, or disembarrassment” (Underworld 585). The repressive lid is 
removed, and the unconscious emotions are released, resulting in pleasure for both 
the comedian and the spectator or the reader. DeLillo considers him an odd kind of 
prophet: “Lenny in his primitive Christian mode, doing offbeat sermons to desert 
rabble” (Underworld 586). Bruce is the postmodern voice in the desert, preaching not 
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of salvation but of the grotesque, the morbid, and the mortifying. Despite certain 
similarities, Bruce’s bleak narrative vo ice does not consume DeLillo’s textual world 
because of a certain affirmative quality in the latter.  
 The repetition of certain jokes and religious references throughout DeLillo’s 
texts can be symptomatic of a deeper belief in a transcendent reality. In “Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle” the “repetition-compulsion” (19) described by Freud refers to the 
impulse to re-enact earlier emotional experiences. Freud identifies two types of 
compulsive behaviour. The first repeats that which has made a deep impression on 
one in order to “make oneself fully master of it” (“Beyond” 15); the pleasure gained 
overcomes the displeasure, caused by the repetition, of surfacing the previously 
repressed emotion. The second repeats a traumatic event in accordance with the death 
instinct Thanatos, independently of the pleasure principle Eros. Since pleasure results 
from the comic in DeLillo’s narratives, as has been argued, DeLillo’s repetition of 
similar jokes can be analysed as the first type of compulsion, and his texts seen as 
exhibiting the attempt to resolve the tension between the desire to believe (the 
repressed) and scepticism (which represses and becomes expressed). In a tender 
moment between Jack and Babette in White Noise, the former comments disarmingly 
on the redemptive powers of ironic distance: “This is the space reserved for irony, 
sympathy and fond amusement, the means by which we rescue ourselves from the 
past” (30). Irony is a way of healing, recuperating, removing onself from the pains 
and losses of the past. Joking is a means of reconciling oneself with an emotion which 
one is unable to manage; for DeLillo’s characters, it is belief, or desire to believe, in a 
transcendent God-like power.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
IRONY AND CRITIQUE IN THE NAMES AND MAO II  
 
The Names and Mao II present so-called cults, weaving in Oriental contexts 
and religions, yet there is no outright denunciation of the two cults in the final 
analysis. Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo suggests that the primary challenges to 
the dominant Christian and rational voice of the West are the demise of imperialism 
and colonialism, and the development of communication and information 
technologies. According to Vattimo, the writing back of the empire allows multiple 
alternative voices to be heard, the process intens ified by widespread media 
transmissions of ideas, generating “no single history, only images from the past 
projected from different points of view” (3). The cult in The Names, and the Moonie 
cult in Mao II are two such alternative voices. His conception of the sacred is multi-
faceted, not limited to Judeo-Christian notions of God, but includes the voices of 
postmodern spiritualities as well – the kaleidoscopic nature of his vision bespeaks of 
divinity which is never stagnant but fluid, constantly evolving since our knowledge is 
imperfect and always in the state of being completed. The Names presents a less 
ironic approach than Mao II to the mystery with which DeLillo is fascinated. In it, 
DeLillo acknowledges the limitations of the human intellect, and establishes the need 
for faith. In Mao II, DeLillo critiques Orientalist attitudes towards Moonie-ism by 
way of irony which can be detected through an analysis of narrative voice. He also 
affirms the positive aspects of fundamentalism – its provision of a vision and an 
identity for the spiritually lost, and the creation of a community.  
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The Names: The Limits of Rationality 
 The Names traces the development of two central characters – James Axton 
and Owen Brademas – as they follow the trails of a mysterious cult known later in the 
novel as “The Names.” Their trajectory shows a movement from scepticism about the 
cult (its highly primitive, even ludicrous, belief system) to an increasing fascination 
with the transcendent. However, the parallel narratives differ in one significant aspect 
– while Axton matures in his spiritual appreciation of the mystical, Owen diminishes 
sharply. Through this contrast, DeLillo weaves in his critique of the failure to 
abandon one’s self to the transcendent, of being overly held back by the rational mind 
and physical limits. 
The novel opens with a description of the narrator’s evasive attitude towards 
the Acropolis, commonly known as the “Sacred Rock” of Athens as it functioned as 
the cult-centre of worship for the city. James Axton is reluctant to confront the 
implications and residual glory of an architectural structure which holds such 
significance: “The weight and moment of those worked stones promised to make the 
business of seeing them a complicated one. So much converges there. It’s what we 
have rescued from the madness. Beauty, dignity, order, proportion. There are 
obligations attached to such a visit” (The Names 3). From the beginning, one senses 
James’ resistance in facing up to the awe and mystery associated with religious 
worship, in bearing the burden of having to make sense of it. In the Nietzschean 
frame of reference, James’ inner tension can be viewed in terms of the split between 
Apollonian structure, restraint, and reason, and its Dionysian antithesis – madness and 
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passion. James recognizes the Apollonian beauty of the Acropolis, but is hesitant at 
this point in the narrative to engage in its Dionysian ecstasy. This resembles the 
narrator in Tap’s (James’ son) story in the final section of the novel who runs away 
from a congregation of tongue-speaking believers, enmeshed in a complex of 
emotions including fear, guilt, and helplessness. James exhibits a similar 
ambivalence: “What ambiguity there is in exalted things. We despise them a little” 
(The Names 3). James’ espousal of spiritual sobriety is countered by his compelling 
need to seek answers, his desire for spiritual knowledge. Hence, there is ambivalence, 
but also an overriding sense of belief in the transcendent, represented in the solid 
Rock which looms in the narrative background.  
 This tension between scepticism and belief is seen again in a later 
conversation between James, his son Tap, and another character Anand Dass (perhaps 
an allusion to American New Age guru Ram Dass). Anand evokes the mystery, awe, 
and visionary nature of religion: “Undreamed sights. Vultures circling the towers of 
silence, where Parsees leave their dead. Jains wearing gauze over their mouths to 
keep from breathing insects and killing them…. ash-gray men wandering naked with 
begging bowl and staff, holy men, sadhus, walking out their lives in mud and dust” 
(The Names 92). Religious devotion often demands that one lives according to a 
different set of principles from the rest of the world – to be holy, set apart. For the 
sadhus, it also means sacrifice, the death of the self. There is also an aesthetic element 
to the spectacle of the holy man: “leaning on staffs, mind-scorched, empty-eyed, men 
in the dust of India, lips moving to the endless name of God” (The Names 92). The 
emphasis lies in the name, the alphabet, language which gives access to ideas and 
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notions. DeLillo’s gracing of these descriptions by way of his beautiful language is 
the main counterforce to ironic presentation. The Axtons do not question these form 
of responses to the divine, only the validity and nature of the God-concept. James 
considers Kathryn and himself “doubters … Sceptics of the slightly superior type. 
The Christian dispersion” (The Names 92); they are bound to the material and the 
tangible:  
The quasi-stellar object, the quantum event, these were the sources of 
our speculation and wonder. Our bones were made of material that 
came swimming across the galaxy from exploded stars. This 
knowledge was our shared prayer, our chant. The grim inexplicable 
was there, the god-mass looming. (The Names 92).  
Tension is generated by James’ use of flexible language to describe beliefs he is 
excluded from by his defining doubt. The Axtons place their faith not in a God who is 
omnipotent and all-consuming, but in a certain narrative which seems to offer logical 
analysis of how existence comes about, while acknowledging the limits to any human 
effort to resolve the mysteries of life. Although James is sceptical and engages in 
“speculation and wonder,” his use of spiritual language (“prayer,” “chant”) betrays 
his inability to sever himself from belief.    
 James and another character Owen Brademas (the director of an 
archaeological dig in Greece) are initially unable to fully accommodate the notion of 
the spiritual even though they inadvertently acknowledge it in their life’s experiences. 
Owen attempts to articulate the effects the Greek island Kouros has on him, and 
refers tentatively to the notion of spirit and soul, “some quality in the experience that 
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goes deeper than the sensory apparatus will allow” (The Names 113). Owen’s 
language here is highly clinical, reflecting the trenchant nature of his scientific and 
logical frame of mind. James concurs with Owen’s sensation of a certain prototypical 
quality about the island which harks back to the origins of existence; the starkness of 
objects on the island leads to a purity of experience, “an absoluteness” (The Names 
113) as James puts it. To James, objects mark the limits of human perception and 
reality – his vision is restricted to the visua l and tangible. In his efforts to understand 
his wife Kathryn’s passion for archaeological work, he concludes that objects signify 
the inadequacy of man by representing “what we aren’t, what we can’t extend 
ourselves to be. […] Objects are the limits we desperately need. They show us where 
we end. They dispel our sadness, temporarily” (The Names 133). The object is, in a 
Kleinian way, the locus of satisfaction. It is the Other that consoles through its 
complementariness to human nature and its establishment of limits that structure 
human perception.  
Despite their scepticism, there is a kind of natural, atavistic, and primal appeal 
about the “The Names” cult which draws Owen, and later, James too. The “The 
Names” cult can be considered a form of postmodern religion which philosopher 
Pamela Sue Anderson views to be “an exercise in finding new possibilities in 
experiencing the impossible” (49), the impossible being that which cannot be 
represented by language, reason, and logic. The cult establishes an equation between 
language, flesh, and space, and then exterminates the point at which they coincide. It 
seeks to pin down a definite correlation between letter and reality/object through their 
acts of violence. It is nostalgic for a language that perfectly replicates reality. Its 
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vision of all people speaking one tongue is strikingly similar to the apocalyptic sense 
of the Moonie cult in Mao II. The “The Names” cult desires to freeze and immobilize 
linguistic meaning so as to gain control and stability. Andahl, one of its cult members, 
explains their desire for a pure language which is not corrupted by historical forces: 
“No gods, no history. […] A dead silence. A place where it is possible for men to stop 
making history. We are inventing a way out” (The Names 209). For the cult, language 
is invested with power, and the way to access this pure language and reality is 
through violence that catapults them into a “frenzy of knowing, of terrible 
confirmation” (The Names 211). However, they find that language does not have 
stable meanings. They themselves are also not satisfied with the tyranny of the 
alphabet and hence try to open it up to infinite possibilities of meanings. Hence, one 
of the murderers gouges rather than bludgeons – “anything to change the sound” 
(211). It is interesting to note that the cult is also marked by mortality. James analyses 
their place as one of “hesitations and textures. An uncertain progress that was like the 
inner labour of some argument. […] A place that was a muffled question” (The 
Names 196). He sees an “element of humanness” (The Names 196) in the formations 
of nature reflecting the passions of sex and death.  
 Owen erroneously attempts to use reason to comprehend the ways of the “The 
Names” cult, interpreting its need for a unifying vision as symptomatic of a fear of 
disorder. Owen’s attraction to the cult transcends mere intellectual fascination – he is 
“gravitationally bound to the cult, as an object to a neutron star, pulled toward its 
collapsed mass, its density” (The Names 286). In his struggles to comprehend the cult, 
he ventures into the Great Indian Desert and concludes that the cult’s killings 
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represent a mockery of “our need to structure and classify, to build a system against 
the terror in our souls. They make the system equal to the terror. The means to 
contend with death has become death” (The Names 308). He surmises that apart from 
matching the letters, the cult does not have any greater significance – these Orientals 
remain “unknowable” (The Names 309) to him. Our last glimpse of Owen is of him 
being “owl-eyed” (The Names 309) – his quest to unveil the ways of the cult has left 
him defeated and deprived of energy; his narrative leaves us with an unsettling aporia, 
silence, and indeterminacy. In contrast to the traditional resonance of visionary 
prophets in the desert (for example, John the Baptist), Owen’s experience has 
overwhelmed and consumed him – the knowledge he attains has proven too much for 
his mind to contain. Unlike “the room he’d been arranging all his life” (The Names 
309), this is something Owen could not organize or make sense of. Owen’s fate 
indicates DeLillo’s acknowledgement of the limits of the rational mind (that which 
has been “left out”) as well as his critique of an over-reliance on rationality as a frame 
to perceive spiritual events. Owen’s denial of the existence of God (The Names 296) 
calls into question his capitulation to religious rituals and expression of spiritual 
fervour. Owen is silenced by James’ poignant remark that all Owen’s strivings would 
be in vain if there is no God.  
 Early in the novel, the Axtons are almost condescending towards the cult, it 
being detached from their lives. However, by the middle of the narrative, James is 
gradually drawn into the web of intrigue and mystery which engulfs the cult. After his 
meeting with Vosdanik, a guide to the cult, James is haunted by his image and words, 
and even dreams of Vosdanik as a “wise and sympathetic figure” (The Names 153). 
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He is caught in the anxiety of trying to understand the nature and motivations of the 
cult. As he progresses, he finds himself deviating from the path of reason, operating 
from an unknown centre: “I also felt I was ahead of myself, doing things that didn’t 
correspond to some reasonable and familiar model. I would have to wait to 
understand” (The Names 191). There is a sense of self- irony here as, being a risk 
analyst, he does not avoid risk. He is open to anything, vulnerable, constantly on the 
edge without seeing the horizon, akin to Volterra’s notion of the open space being a 
means through which man confronts existence (The Names 198). In this sense, Axton 
is experiencing an existential crisis. Later, he aligns himself with the inexplicable, 
with the desire to “vault into eternity” (The Names 203) when he determines that he 
“would conceal [himself] in Volterra’s obsession as I had in Owen’s unprotected 
pain, his songs of helplessness” (The Names 205), to seek and face up to the 
transcendent. 
 James eventually escapes Owen’s fate by adopting a non-reflective attitude, 
and instead arrives at an appreciation of the beauty of the tangible world. He sees, for 
instance, “colours [he]’d never seen, brilliances, worlds” (The Names 309) in 
dyestuffs and ground spices. While Owen has lost, James feels he has triumphed in “a 
contest of some singular and gratifying kind” (The Names 309). This is the “real” 
world. For a moment, it seems that DeLillo is advocating a phenomenological 
approach to existence. However, James’ conclusion is complicated by the 
juxtaposition of Owen’s memories of church-going with his narrative of his encounter 
with the cult, and Tap’s retelling of Owen’s encounter with tongues in the last section 
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of the novel. This will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. DeLillo’s 
notion of faith is often via negation.  
 
Owen Brademas: Failure of Spiritual Abandonment 
 Owen resides in the liminal space between fear of the incomprehensible 
transcendent that threatens to overwhelm him, and longing for it. Hence, he hesitates 
to embrace it wholeheartedly. This section focuses on Owen’s ambivalence towards 
Pentecostalism, in order to show how Owen’s inability to flow with and in the Holy 
Spirit is critiqued by DeLillo as a form of withholding which denies the self intense 
spiritual experiences. My focus here is not on the validity or ambiguity of the 
transcendent experience, but the tensions and struggles within Owen in his response 
to the spiritual. Owen’s resistance to spiritual abandonment can be seen, for instance, 
in how he constantly tries to maintain a grip on his consciousness – he climbs stairs 
two steps at a time to keep ahead of himself (The Names 74). On the other hand, he 
also feels envy towards those who are able to divest themselves of their reservations. 
As Owen himself ruminates: “In his fear of things that took place on such a rampant 
scale [for example, the speaking of tongues], was there an element of desperate envy? 
Was it enviable?” (The Names 285).  
 Owen is suspicious of unpredictable energies, preferring instead the stability 
and security offered by traditional religion. He perceives the self as a threat because 
of its “relentlessness” and “predeterminative quality” (The Names 172), suggesting 
his wariness of the self’s tendencies towards Dionysian chaos and destruction. In his 
childhood, the church was a symbol of Apollonian safety and idyllic peace, situated 
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“by a river, among cottonwoods, in the shade of the long afternoons” (The Names 
172). The minister was comforting as he resembled a “civic leader, sweat-stained and 
pink, a large man with white ha ir, booming by the river” (The Names 172) – an 
almost iconic figure in his familiarity, humanity, and a mixture of the frailty and 
stature of old age. The congregation seemed engulfed in the aura of a past world: 
Light fell across the pews with the mysterious softness of some  
 remembered blessing, some serious happy glimpse of another world. It 
 was a memory of light, a memory you could see in the present  
moment, feel in the warmth on your hands, it was light too dense to be 
an immediate account of things, it carried history in it, it was light 
filtered through dusty time. (The Names 172; italics original) 
Owen’s vision is infused with a deep sense of the sacred, alluding to the glory of God 
that has pervaded the history of Judaism and Christianity. The past and the present 
coincide in a moment of significant joy for Owen. This is a Proustian moment defined 
by the transcendent memory. Owen’s account, however, is ambiguous because one is 
unsure if it is purely the adult Owen’s memory, or the actual experience of the boy 
Owen. It is also possible to read this recount as marking the resolution of the two 
aspects of Owen. Nevertheless, it reveals a certain spiritual inclination directed 
towards a divine source, in this case, the Christian God.  
 In contrast, “[w]hen things went bad and they moved to the tallgrass prairie, 
his parents joined a pentecostal church. There was nothing safe about this church” 
(The Names 173). It is “set in the middle of nowhere” (The Names 173), and induces 
only fear and a strange awe in Owen, who could not make sense of the phenomenon 
 60 
of tongue-speaking or glossolalia – some of the spiritual manifestations include 
falling into a trance, clapping, weeping, and producing chant- like effects.26 What 
disturbs Owen is the worshippers’ unrestrained abandonment to a higher power which 
is alien to him and which he cannot access. His detachedness is exacerbated by the 
apparent seamless connectedness of the worshippers to the spirit, the “inside-outness 
of this sound, the tumbling out of found words, the arms raised, the tremble” (The 
Names 173). When a believer is filled with (or baptized in) the Holy Spirit, the Spirit 
so overpowers him that he is in a state of ecstasy with no control over his faculties. 
The Spirit then enables him to speak in other languages, often with the liberation of 
bodily movements and other forms of expression resulting from the temporary loss of 
ego and self-consciousness. The experience of being filled by the Spirit is a 
transcendent event in its release of the subject from the bounds of bodily-based 
selfhood. 
 Owen attempts to de-mystify this transcendent experience he has witnessed by 
showing that it is not an esoteric event experienced by a privileged few individuals. 
There is sarcasm and wonder when he reflects: “Imagine their surprise, these tax-
paying people […] these veterans of patio barbeques, when they learned they were 
carriers of ecstasy” (The Names 173). He goes on to pronounce it as “learned 
behaviour, fabricated speech, meaningless speech. It is a life focus for depressed 
people” (The Names 173). This clearly reveals a condescending attitude towards those 
who engage in glossolalia, but Owen’s resistance to intense religious experience can 
                                                 
26 Pentecostalism has its origins in the experience of the disciples of Jesus Christ at the feast of 
Pentecost, during which they were “all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other 
tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance” (Acts 2:1-4). For Pentecostals, baptism in or with the Holy 
Spirit empowers the believer and consequently the church. Tongue speaking, accompanied by other 
signs and miracles, occurred in the New Testament church (Mark 16, Acts, and 1 Cor. 12-24).  
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also suggest a man who is intent on keeping out the spiritual in order to repress his 
desire to experience the same.  
The fear of mass awe, yet attraction to it, is a recurring theme treated by 
DeLillo in his fiction. Owen could not access the experience in his childhood because 
of the fear of the mass awe; this is a fear he still cannot overcome. Owen is described 
by James as a man who “yielded himself completely to things” (The Names 20), yet 
he is unable to surrender to spiritual experiences involving heightened emotions and 
communion. As he himself confesses: “Masses of people scare me. Religion. People 
driven by the same powerful emotion. All that reverence, awe, dread. I’m a boy from 
the prairie” (The Names 24). The fear of mass awe and the individual versus crowd 
dichotomy can be linked to the Cold War imagination that thrives on the Western fear 
of being contaminated by totalitarianism. Owen’s fear of mass awe can be read in the 
light of Julia Kristeva’s notion of abjection (the rejection of what is foreign or impure 
to one’s self) as the process of delineating the borders of an always tenuous 
subjectivity. For Kristeva, the subject is simultaneously drawn to and repelled by the 
abject, which is ultimately maternal. Freud terms it “the oceanic feeling […] as of 
something limitless, unbounded” (Civilization 9). As McAfee puts it: “Faced with the 
abject, the borders of the self are, paradoxically, continuously threatened and 
maintained. They are threatened because the abject is alluring enough to crumble the 
borders of self; they are maintained because the fear of such a collapse keeps the 
subject vigilant” (49-50). Similarly, Owen exists in a state of tension with the abject: 
he is fearful of losing his self in mass ecstasy, yet fascinated by it and longs to 
“[s]urrender” (The Names 296) to it. Owen rejects the transcendent intellectually, but 
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emotionally he exhibits an inability to come to terms with it fully. Hence, he is 
always perched on the border of the known and the unknown, never able to access the 
spiritual core: “It’s just beyond reach, something that touches me deeply. I can’t quite 
get it and hold it” (The Names 26). Despite Owen’s rationalization and protestations, 
there remains a lingering sense of loss: “He measured what he was saying like a man 
determined to be objective, someone utterly convinced of the soundness of a 
proposition but wondering in a distant way (or trying to remember) whether anything 
has been left out” (The Names 173). When James asks him what remains, Owen can 
only utter: “Ah. I ask myself” (The Names 173). There is fear of, as well as desire for, 
transcendence and spiritual engagement.    
 Similarly fearful of mass awe, Orville Benton, the protagonist of Tap’s 
narrative in the concluding section of The Names, falls back to “real things” (The 
Names 339), but this reality is also fraught with contradictions. Just as Lucifer 
remains a source of fascination even in his fall, material reality is “the fallen wonder 
of the world” – a “nightmare” which is viscereal, yet intriguing (The Names 339). 
While I concur with critic Mark Osteen’s view of glossolalia as being privileged by 
DeLillo, I contend with his conclusion that “[f]or Orville, as for Axton, Brademas, 
and DeLillo’s readers, there will be no new Pentecost; we […] may find a secondary 
transcendence through verbal oblations” (139). I argue that DeLillo does not reject 
the possibility of a spiritual transcendent; in fact, he shows the need for faith to 
embrace it – precisely the element which both Owen and Orville lack.27 Orville 
confesses: “He wanted freely to yeeld [sic] but he couldn’t get there or go across to 
[those speaking in tongues]” (The Names 338). Tap’s writing is intense, emotional, 
                                                 
27 See Osteen for a discussion of the significance of the signifier “ob” in Mao II (140-141). 
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and cathartic, but it speaks of angst, fear, and frustration. Hence, DeLillo sympathizes 
with, and critiques, Owen and Orville’s inability to transcend the mind and the body 
in order to encounter a spiritual reality. What they are left with is an ambivalent 
relationship with the more tangible world of objects. 
 
Mao II: DeLillo’s Ironic Lens on Moonie-ism  
 Though Mao II centres on four white Americans (Karen Janney, Scott 
Martineau, Brita Nilsson, and Bill Gray), its focus shifts eastwards as the main 
characters either move physically towards the Middle East or are drawn to the 
Moonie religion.28 The novel opens with a scene from Yankee Stadium – a surreal 
spectacle of a Moonie mass wedding officiated by Reverend Sun Myung Moon – and 
we quickly learn of Karen’s marriage to a Korean man whom she has met only two 
days ago. An amalgam of Korean religious traditions, Christianity, science, secular 
philosophies, and an intentional global consciousness, Moonie- ism is an example of 
postmodern spiritualities that are themselves a concoction or cocktail of different 
influences. The novel follows Karen’s activities while with the Moonies, her 
detachment from the Moonie religion, and her eventual return to preaching Reverend 
Moon’s message of salvation.  
DeLillo reflects the sense of the Moonies’ “otherness” to mainstream 
American culture. Within the narrative, there is also a strong critical voice towards 
                                                 
28 The other narratives in the novel are those of American writer Bill who sacrifices himself in his 
attempt to save a Swiss poet held hostage by fundamentalist Lebanese terrorists; Bill’s manager Scott 
who picks up Karen and forms a community with her and Bill; as well as photographer Brita who, at 
the outset of the novel, captures Bill’s image on film, and travels to Beirut to photograph terrorist chief 
Abu Rashid in the last section of the novel. 
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Moonie- ism. Reverend Moon, for instance, is not exempt from DeLillo’s parodic 
powers:  
This is a man of chunky build who saw Jesus on a mountainside. He 
spent nine years praying and wept so long and hard his tears formed 
puddles and soaked through the floor and dripped into the room below 
and filtered through the foundation of the house into the earth. (Mao II 
6) 
The narrator’s use of hyperbole in the above short description of Reverend Moon 
casts him in a comic light and encourages us to disbelieve the man and his messianic 
claims.29 It is a satirical view of the Moonie leader presented in a deadpan voice. 
DeLillo also unflinchingly shows the failings of Moonie-ism through Karen’s life: 
firstly, through her revelation in the last part of the novel that instead of having relied 
on any prophetic powers to unite couples for marriage, Reverend Moon had merely 
matched individual photographs together the day before the mass wedding (Mao II 
183); secondly, Karen ends up emotionally wrecked and still spiritually lost even 
after trying to evangelize to the poor in the park (Mao II 193). She retreats to Scott’s 
abode and Scott describes her as “looking not so different from the first time he’d 
seen her, a cloud dreamer on a summer’s day” (Mao II 218). Reverend Moon is also 
condescendingly described by the narrator as “a man who lived in a hut made of U.S. 
Army ration tins and now he is here, in American light, come to lead them to the end 
of history” (Mao II 6; italics mine).  
                                                 
29 The official website of the Unification Church states: “At Easter time in 1935, Jesus appeared to the 
young Sun Myung Moon as he was praying in the Korean mountains […] he went into ever deeper 
communion with God and entered the vast battlefield of the spirit and flesh” (Rev. and Mrs. Moon). 
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Critics have also variously linked DeLillo’s portrayal of Moonie-ism in this 
novel to fundamentalism and totalitarianism – forces opposed to democratic America. 
In his important study Late Imperial Romance, John McClure argues that the end of 
the Cold War has precipitated a crisis in the state of romance which was previously 
dependent on the existence of conflict, danger, and the unknown. The other nemesis 
of romance he refers to is “the process by which the secularizing discourses of the 
West have been eradicating, as it were, the most sublime and mysterious regions of 
the religious cosmos, the realms of divinities and demons and of the soul after death” 
(3). Subsequently, he examines how American writers30 have variously tried to resist 
this loss of romance and re-enchant the world through their fiction. Situating 
DeLillo’s texts in the context of the late imperial romance, McClure asserts that 
DeLillo replays the Cold War Soviet-American conflict with “new global adversaries, 
foremost among them a resurgent Islamic world” (146), legitimating America’s role 
as the “global protector of difference and diversity – religious, cultural, and political – 
against a soulless East” (145). Essentially, McClure reads Mao II as DeLillo’s 
proclamation of America as the crusader for democracy in a post-Cold War world in 
which Communism has been defeated. The following is his specific criticism of 
DeLillo:  
He rehearses the old opposition between the democratic West and 
Communist – now Maoist or post-Maoist – East, but then goes on to 
link Mao to Reverend Moon, and the Ayatollah Khomeini, who are 
depicted as leading great revival movements which are also 
movements of religious rationalization. On one side, then, the novel 
                                                 
30 He focuses on Joan Didion, Robert Stone, DeLillo, and Thomas Pynchon. 
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posits a deeply imperfect but still democratic and diverse West, where 
even religion produces a “democracy of icons” (168); on the other it 
posits a fanatically mobilized East intolerant of all difference and 
caught up in rationalized forms of millenarian hysteria. (146) 
According to McClure, Mao II is Orientalist as it sets up a rigid binary between a 
democratic West which celebrates individual freedom and heteroglossia, and a 
totalitarian East which embodies the opposite of all these qualities. McClure’s claim 
seems to resonate with Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism as a “style of thought 
based [erroneously] upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between ‘the 
Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’” (Orientalism 2).  
 It is not difficult to agree with McClure’s reading of Moonie-ism being 
associated with a repressive and controlling fundamentalist system. From the 
beginning of the novel, the Moonie members are represented not as individuals, but 
as “one continuous wave,” “one body,” and “an undifferentiated mass” (3). What is 
emphasized is their conformity to the cult, their uniformity, and their similarity to one 
another. Daily existence for them is highly regimental and controlled by Master, 
down to details like taking cold showers (Mao II 10). However, by looking closely at 
the use of narrative voices, I would like to suggest the possibility of reading the 
Moonie mass wedding episode as DeLillo’s critique of the middle-class American 
psyche which he reveals to be parochial, complacent, and intolerant. We first view the 
Moonie wedding from the perspective of Rodge Janney (Karen’s father) and what he 
first highlights is the creation of an almost surreal entity by the masses: “From a 
series of linked couples they become one continuous wave, larger all the time, 
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covering the open spaces in navy and white” (Mao II 3). Rodge is disturbed by this 
“undifferentiated mass” (Mao II 3) because its reality is beyond the boundaries of his 
familiar space, and not within his control and understanding. He is suddenly 
confronted with an event which he does not possess the means to name or define: 
“He’s got a degree and a business and a tax attorney and a cardiologist and a mutual 
fund and whole life and major medical. But do the assurances always apply? There is 
a strangeness down there that he never thought he’d see in a ballpark” (Mao II 4). It is 
useful here to refer to Said’s concept of imaginative geography in which he claims 
that “[a]ll kinds of suppositions, associations, and fictions appear to crowd the 
unfamiliar space outside one’s own” (54). Rodge’s responses towards the Moonies 
are motivated by the fear of what he does not know or understand, hence his 
declaration to his wife Maureen of his intention to “examine this organization. Hit the 
libraries, get on the phone, contact parents, truly delve” (Mao II 11). The phrase 
“truly delve” expresses Rodge’s misplaced confidence in himself and information 
sources. The ironizing of Rodge’s individual effort does not necessarily mean that 
DeLillo embraces Moonism. However, it leaves open the possibility of alternatives to 
rational thought.   
Furthermore, while we could probably empathize with Rodge’s anxiety about 
Karen’s marriage to a virtual stranger, we are also made aware of Rodge’s 
domineering nature through his conversation with Maureen:  
  “Who the hell thought it up? What does it mean?” 
  “What are you going to do when you find her? Wave  
goodbye?” 
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  “I just need to know she’s here,” Rodge says. “I want to  
document it, okay.” 
  “Because that’s what it is. If it hasn’t been goodbye up to this 
  point, it certainly is now.” 
  “Hey, Maureen? Shut up.” (Mao II 5) 
This is a man settled into an organized security who would react defensively to any 
alien element which threatens his fossilized existence. Furthermore, he not only 
requires control over his own life, he seeks to control others as well – clearly evident 
later in the novel when he organizes familial members in kidnapping Karen from the 
Moonies, and subjects her to deprogramming. When Rodge comments sarcastically, 
“I see a lot of faces that don’t look American. They send them out in missionary 
teams. Maybe they think we’ve sunk to the status of less developed country. They’re 
here to show us the way and the light” (Mao II 5), we are not encouraged to identify 
with him but to distance ourselves from his racist stance. The Moonie wedding is 
hence depicted through the eyes of white Americans as a strange and surreal event, 
and DeLillo stages the Orientalist paradigms in order to critique those same 
worldviews. 
 One is reminded of a similar critique in Underworld in the scene where Nick 
Shay draws character Simeon Biggs’ attention to dietrologia, an Italian word for the 
science of what is behind an event. Often associated with paranoia and conspiracy 
theories, dietrologia is counter-information which challenges established, common, or 
conventional knowledge. Sims’ rejection of dietrologia modulates from direct refusal, 
to comic irrelevance, appeal to reason, easy dismissal, and finally, mockery: 
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   “They [Italians] need this science. I don’t need it.” 
   “I don’t need it either. I’m just telling you.” 
   “I’m an American. I go to ball games,” he said. 
“The science of dark forces. Evidently they feel this science is 
legitimate enough to require a name.” 
“People who need this science, I would make an effort to tell 
them we have real sciences, hard sciences, we don’t need imaginary 
ones.” 
“I’m just telling you the word. I agree with you, Sims. But the 
word exists.” 
“There’s always a word. There’s probably a museum too. The 
Museum of Dark Forces. They have ten thousand blurry photographs. 
Or did the Mafia blow it up?” 
This is where Sims laughed, showing a mouth crisscrossed 
with cheddar. (Underworld 280) 
Although Nick indicates his alliance with Sims on this issue, DeLillo’s representation 
of Sims as parochial, bigoted, and ultimately unattractive suggests a rejection of 
Sims’ too-easy dismissal of alternative explanations for human situations. Sims 
identifies himself with ball games – the sign of American comfort, realism, and 
normalcy. The exchange between the two men opens up, more than it closes down, 
the possibility of unseen forces. In the face of Sims’ flat rejection, Nick maintains an 
interest.  
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 Furthermore, fundamentalism can be a regenerative force, and DeLillo is not 
against viewing it in this light. In the midst of the mass wedding, Karen “feels intact, 
rayed with well-being […] immunized against the language of self” (Mao II 8). She 
experiences a sense of rejuvenation of health and fullness, transcending bodily 
imperfections and the petty concerns of life. In a fragmented world, Moonie- ism 
offers structure, hope, and certainty: “World in pieces. It is shock of shocks. But there 
is plan. Pali-pali. Bring hurry-up time to all man” (Mao II 9). Karen could be deluded: 
the Moonie beliefs seem like baby-talk, and “pali-pali” sounds unconvincing. 
However, in contrast to her parents’ existential anxiety and lack of a centre, her belief 
appears appealing. According to Castells, fundamentalism is involved in constructing 
a form of resistance identity in the wake of the dispersal of religious strongholds like 
Christianity. This has also been acknowledged by Bauman who, while associating 
fundamentalism with totalitarianism, diagnoses it as an “alternative rationality” (74) 
which exposes the deficiencies and limitations of postmodern societies. In other 
words, fundamentalism, as a rational choice rather than a form of false consciousness, 
can function as a critique of postmodernity. Fundamentalism, in its emphasis on strict 
and literal adherence to a set of basic principles, offers respite from the floating sea of 
possibilities exacerbated by consumerist culture. It provides the certainties and 
absoluteness needed in a world fraught by disintegrating meaning systems. 
 Although the cult is gradually shown to be ineffectual, there is the 
acknowledgement too that Moonie-ism fills a spiritual gap in Western society, the 
human need for belief in something that transcends the tangible world: “When the 
Old God leaves the world, what happens to all the unexpended faith?” (Mao II 7). 
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The Moonie mass wedding climaxes in the highly intense End Time chant led by 
Reverend Moon: “He leads them out past religion and history, thousands weeping 
now, all arms high. They are gripped by the force of a longing […] for new life, peace 
eternal, the end of soul- lonely pain […] They chant for one language, one word, for 
the time when names are lost” (Mao II 16). This rather atavistic scene, characterized 
by ecstasy and the outward expression of primal longings through a ritual, is also 
strangely appealing in its portrayal of individuals being overcome by a force which 
has the capacity to erase human sorrows and isolation. Western thought has generally 
tended towards the teleological, as an analysis of Judaic, Christian, Hegelian, and 
Marxist thinking will easily show. Hence, millennial anxieties can be understood as 
human expressions of, or reactions to, the end of history, whatever manifold forms 
that end may take.  
 This emotionally charged event is contrasted with montages from a dreary 
modern existence: “People sit at desks and stare at office walls. They smell their 
shirts and drop them into the hamper. People bind themselves into numbered seats 
and fly across time zones and high cirrus and deep night, knowing there is something 
they’ve forgotten to do” (Mao II 16). In comparison, subscribing to the Moonie fa ith 
offers a heightened experience which enables one to transcend these moments of 
emptiness, staleness, and loss. Rodge, however, depends totally on his rational mind, 
attempting to account for the mass belief in a religion he thinks is unfounded. Karen 
terms his mode of thinking “old college logic” incapable of allowing intellectual 
space for the transcendental: “They bring us up to believe but when we show them 
true belief they call out psychiatrists and police. We know who God is. This makes us 
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crazy in the world” (Mao II 8). Although Karen does not return to the Moonie church 
after being abducted by her father and cousin Rick, she still believes in Moonie 
teachings and has “Master’s total voice ready in her head” (Mao II 194). Moonie- ism 
may not ultimately be verifiable, or it could be just one man’s delusion of grandeur, 
but in Mao II’s narrative, it is preferable to a parochial American middle-class 
mentality or the sterility of daily urban existence. It certainly seems more 
compassionate and respectful of the other’s will compared to the violent and 
hypocritical deprogramming Karen is subjected to while in her father’s hands (Mao II 
78-83).  
 I have attempted to show that DeLillo critiques the American Orientalist 
attitude of rejecting that which lies beyond one’s familiar cultural space, and that 
while he critiques and casts doubt on the Moonie religion, he also recognizes the 
immanent religious impulse in man, as well as Moonie- ism’s power to satisfy deep 
human desires. I concede much of the bizarreness of the cult (as presented by 
DeLillo), but argue that the residual haunting appeal of Moonie- ism cannot be denied. 
In setting up Asian masses against the individualist Rodge, Mao II is, in many ways, 
Orientalist. However, the text also resists an Orientalist reading in which, according 
to Said, “[r]ationality is undermined by Eastern excesses, those mysteriously 
attractive opposites to what seem to be normal values” (57). Perhaps what DeLillo 
finally shows is how, despite the inadequacies and dangers of any religious system, 
man will still be drawn to the transcendental. DeLillo ultimately advocates spiritual 
faith in the transcendent – capitulation to forces beyond the rational mind. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
MELANCHOLIA: THE UNDERWORLD OF LOSS 
 
Psychoanalytic thinker Kristeva asserts that literature “represents the ultimate 
coding of our crises, of our most intimate and most serious apocalypses” (Powers of 
Horror 208). According to Kristeva, literature provides a therapeutic means, for the 
author and the reader, of working through their various psychic maladies (for 
instance, abjection, melancholia, and various neuroses and psychoses). Hence, it is 
cathartic and displays the symptoms of the malady. In this context, the melancholic 
tone in DeLillo’s narratives can be seen as hinting at an underlying existential crisis. 
This chapter argues that the melancholia of DeLillo’s characters is the product of an 
originary loss, the lost Object being spiritual wholeness. While I would draw on 
psychoanalytic descriptions of melancholia in exploring DeLillo’s representations of 
it, my focus is on literary melancholia, how he employs language and literary 
structures to create a sense of depression in his texts. Melancholia is variously 
embodied in DeLillo’s narratives through his use of imagery, silences, associations, 
satire, and comic and tragic forms. DeLillo’s characterization, narrative structures and 
trajectories, and thematic preoccupations would also be considered.  
His characters’ melancholia is constituted of a deep sense of loss that leads to, 
and can be discerned in, their longing for fullness of being and their quest for the 
transcendent. Spirituality in DeLillo’s fiction is hence marked by his characters’ need 
to recover the sacred that has been lost, in order to make the self whole again. In this 
sense, the melancholic tone in his fiction is indicative of the continuing presence of 
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implicit belief despite scepticism. DeLillo’s characters also transform melancholia 
into beauty and pleasure for themselves and the reader, exemplifying the recycling 
and redemption of otherwise wasted psychic energies.31 The aestheticization of 
melancholia indicates the characters’ ability to articulate and symbolize their painful 
loss, initiating the process of overcoming their depression. The beauty of language 
becomes a form of substitute for the lost object. However, art offers only temporary 
relief from the reality of loss. 
 
Melancholic Narratives 
 Psychoanalytic theories on melancholia draw a link between loss and 
depression. In his essay “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud argues that mourning 
and melancholia are responses to the loss of a libidinal object.32 Freud lists the 
symptoms of melancholia as “a profoundly painful dejection, abrogation of interest in 
the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a 
lowering of the self- regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-
reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of 
punishment” (“Mourning and Melancholia” 143). Thus defined, melancholia is a 
debilitating, pathological condition which generally involves alienation from others 
                                                 
31 This is in line with DeLillo’s textual concern with the management of waste, most clearly seen in 
Underworld which has a waste analyst (Nick Shay) as its protagonist.  
32 In the normal process of mourning, the ego, aware that the object no longer exists, gradually severs 
its attachment to the object and relinquishes it. If one is unable to mourn, he becomes melancholic or 
depressed. In melancholia, the ego identifies with the lost object, seeking to incorporate the object into 
itself (introjection). The aggression towards the lost object is directed against the ego, resulting in 
diminished self-regard. The loss of self-esteem is the only difference between mourning and 
melancholia highlighted by Freud. 
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and a loss of self-esteem and self-reliance.33 DeLillo’s characters are defined by a 
deep sense of loss which bespeaks an incomplete self. As Nick Shay reflects in 
Underworld: “Most of our longings go unfulfilled. This is the word’s wistful 
implication – a desire for something lost or fled or otherwise out of reach” (803). This 
is especially evident in Underworld in which every character experiences loss in 
various forms: the young boy Cotter Martin has his treasured baseball stolen by his 
father; Nick and Matt Shay repeatedly mourn (albeit in an off-handed way) for their 
father Jimmy Costanza34 who had gone out for some cigarettes and mysteriously 
disappeared; Nick’s wife Marian conceives of her dead parents as ghosts 
(Underworld 165); Marvin Lundy’s loss of his wife Eleanor compels him to a 
frenzied accumulation of baseball memorabilia (Underworld 191).  
 While Freud argues that melancholia originates from displaced aggression for 
an object, Kristeva views melancholia as the inability to establish object relations.35 
For Kristeva, “sadness would point to a primitive self – wounded, incomplete, empty” 
(Black Sun 12). What is yearned for can never be attained; it is an “impossible love, 
never reached, always elsewhere, such as the promises of nothingness, of death” 
(Black Sun 13). Melancholic loss, in Kristevan terms, is more fundamental than the 
loss of an object; she is more concerned with the loss experienced by the subject 
while in the chora, before entry into the symbolic realm. She traces melancholia back 
to the loss of the “Thing”: “the real that does not lend itself to signification, the centre 
                                                 
33 Melancholia is often perceived to be an affliction of the individual, but the scope of the term has 
widened in the past four decades to include collective melancholia in the social, political, and cultural 
sense. Sociologist Wolf Lepenies, for instance, focuses on melancholy as a response by social classes 
(in particular, the aristocracy) to specific historical changes. 
34 This is also a lost name and disappearing ethnicity. 
35 Although some aspects of Kristeva’s work conform to Freud’s ideas, she acknowledges eventually 
that the maternal nature of the Thing is illusory. 
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of attraction and repulsion” (Black Sun 13). The Kristevan real corresponds to the 
Lacanian Real which “lies outside or beyond the symbolic process, the superseding 
power of totality” (Minsky 147), a psychic realm defined by original fullness and 
unity, and which cannot be symbolized by language. The “Thing” is a vague, 
indeterminate something, a “light without representation – a black sun” (Black Sun 
13). Kristeva has borrowed and appropriated the notion of the chora (???a) from 
Greek philosopher Plato’s creation myth in the Timaeus. The Platonian chora is space 
in its nascency, “both receptacle and nurse, that is, the container and the producer, of 
what the universe is before and as anything exists” (McAfee 19).36 Kristeva’s chora is 
a state of plenitude and bliss referring specifically to the maternal womb. I am not 
adopting Kristeva’s gendered definition of the chora, but wish to argue that DeLillo’s 
melancholia stems from the loss of originary fullness (represented by the Platonian 
chora), and that the desire and effort to return to that blissful state reveal an implicit 
need for, or belief in, a transcendent (or the Thing, as Kristeva puts it).37  
 Many of DeLillo’s characters are visibly sad and headed for some personal 
catastrophe, for example death-obsessed Jack Gladney in White Noise, reclusive 
writer Bill Gray in Mao II, and ex-delinquent Nick Shay in Underworld.38 Bill Gray, 
whom critic Adam Begley has described as “a portrait shot through with despair […] 
                                                 
36 Plato’s chora “provides a fixed site for all things that come to be. It is itself apprehended by a kind of 
bastard reasoning that does not involve sense perception, and it is hardly even an object of conviction. 
We look at it as in a dream when we say that everything that exists must of necessity be somewhere, in 
some place and occupying some space” (Timaeus 52b-c). 
37 I am not disagreeing with the gendered approach, merely that it is unnecessary to my current 
argument. 
38 In his study of DeLillo’s first ten novels, Douglas Keesey examines how mediating structures 
impede self-realization and communication between characters. He argues that DeLillo’s fiction “is 
about  the media’s flattening of character, the way representations of reality disturb our connection with 
the world, impoverish our experience, and reduce our dimensionality” (198). I agree that the media 
exacerbate the difficulties of identity-formation, but wish to argue that melancholia stems from more 
fundamental causes than technological disruptions to the human psyche. 
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exhausted, empty, defeated” (53), can be considered a melancholic. Bill is a solitary 
figure, manipulated by Scott, who dies quietly in a ship’s bunk, his passport and other 
means of identification stolen by an old man with a limp (Mao II 217). The world has 
lost its aura and repetition has replaced creation: “Photocopy Mao, silk-screen Mao, 
wallpaper Mao, synthetic-polymer Mao” (Mao II 21). Hence, the artist is in despair. 
The sense of Bill being defined by lack is evident in the text. The landscape of White 
Noise is littered with people who are alienated from one another, lead lost and 
purposeless lives, and “plan their lives around lonely walks in the evening” (20). It is 
a world in which blankness and emptiness are the common denominators and “a man 
in a rocker star[ing] into space” (White Noise 21) is a usual sight. There is a deep 
sense of vacuity, of life drained of meaning and fullness. 
The sense of man being fundamentally flawed is conveyed clearly in 
Underworld: “Every bad smell is about us. We make our way through the world and 
come upon a scene that is medieval-modern, a city of high-rise garbage, the hell reek 
of every perishable object ever thrown together, and it seems like something we’ve 
been carrying all our lives” (104). Character Klara Sax calls it the “swerve from 
evenness that marks a thing lastingly” (Underworld 444) – the essence of Sergei 
Eisenstein’s film Unterwelt. Edgar Hoover’s “lead-lined coffin of one thousand 
pound plus. To protect his body from worms, germs, moles, voles and vandals […] to 
keep him safe from nuclear war” (Underworld 577-8) is a source of dark comedy39 
arising from the tragic futility of Hoover’s exaggerated efforts to keep out death and 
                                                 
39 DeLillo’s use of dark humour also contributes to the sense of melancholia. According to critic Alan 
Pratt, black humour offers scathing critiques of human systems and behaviours (through subversion, 
blasphemies, and lampoons for instance), but it does not suggest any means of alleviating the anguish 
(xix).  
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destruction. Man is condemned by the mark of mortality, or as character Jack 
Gladney puts it in White Noise: “All plots tend to move deathward” (26). White Noise 
is often read as a satire (as was observed in the first chapter), but there is a sense of 
gravity in Gladney’s statement here which goes beyond the tongue- in-cheek. In White 
Noise, DeLillo’s melancholic vision materializes in the tragic scene of Jack Gladney 
standing in a pile of garbage, trying to find the elixir of life which would eradicate his 
fear of death and enable him to cope with the traumas of life. DeLillo details the 
items found: “crayon drawings of a figure with full breasts and male genitals […] a 
banana skin with a tampon inside […] a horrible clotted mass of hair, soap, ear swabs, 
crushed roaches, flip-toe rings, sterile pads smeared with pus and bacon fat, strands of 
frayed dental floss, fragments of ballpoint refills, toothpicks still displaying bits of 
impaled food” (259). This is where man is exposed as nothing more than a flawed 
leaking creature with needs, who is also the producer of much horror and ugliness. In 
the Kristevan sense, the human being is “wounded, incomplete, empty” (12). The 
human being suffers lack, and manifests the desire to recover perfection.   
This is a sick world in which one needs to take pills to maintain the proper 
functioning of the body. The consumption of medicine has become the norm: “Blood 
pressure pills, stress pills, allergy pills, eye drops, aspirin. Run of the mill” (White 
Noise 62), and finally, Dylar. The different drugs have become symptoms of malaise. 
In Mao II, Bill Gray medicates, possibly to combat his lack of energy and sense of 
debilitation; in Underworld, Marian Shay is addicted to valium; in White Noise, 
Babette’s father Vernon Dickey suffers from various ailments like a limp, cough, 
insomnia, loose teeth, and shaky hands. In his short monologue (255-6), Vernon 
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attempts to alleviate Babette’s worries by dismissively joking about the signs of his 
bodily degeneration. However, the gradual failure of the body is a reality which 
pierces through his deadpan humour, intensifying the sense of melancholy. Novelist 
William Styron, a former victim of depression, also draws a link between melancholia 
and hypochondria: “unwilling to accept its own gathering deterioration, the mind 
announces to its indwelling consciousness that it is the body with its perhaps 
correctable defects – not the precious and irreplaceable mind – that is going haywire” 
(44). The melancholic’s physical body ceases to function properly, and he is thrown 
into a state of limbo: “The madness of depression is, generally speaking, the 
antithesis of violence […] Soon evident are the slowed-down responses, near 
paralysis, psychic energy throttled back close to zero” (Styron 47).40  
Furthermore, DeLillo’s parody contains a melancholic aspect in its affirmation 
and desire for a lost spiritual state of bliss. When Jack Gladney earnestly cries out for 
revelations to life’s mysteries in White Noise: “Don’t let us die, I want to cry out to 
that fifth century sky ablaze with mystery and spiral light. Let us both live forever, in 
sickness and in health, feeble-minded, doddering, toothless, liver-spotted, dim-
sighted, hallucinating. Who decides these things? What is out there? Who are you?” 
(103), his plea reveals the anguish of imperfect human knowledge and being. In his 
parody of the traditional wedding vows, he recognizes, with humility, his own 
helplessness, humanity, ignorance, limitations, and inevitable degeneration. The vows 
are hence affirmed as ideals to aspire to, and the sense of desperation becomes even 
                                                 
40 That the body exerts an effect on the mind can be traced back to humoral medicine as black bile. See 
Richard Burton’s classic text Anatomy of Melancholy for a discussion of how the body and the soul 
work upon each other. Fluids are the manifestations of mental changes, and this concept of affect 
remained prevalent down to the nineteenth century. Now, humoral medicine is relevant in illumining 
the links between emotions and the physical environment. 
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more urgent in the very real possibility of losing a loved one to the great unknown. 
The melancholy stems from Jack’s confrontation with the immensity of an unknown 
wilderness, and how death is inevitable. Bauman believes that modernity, with its 
humanist orientation and its preoccupation with the present and the material, has 
alienated man from the awareness of his own mortality and, more importantly, 
dissociated death from the religious realm.41 Man is hence severed from the spiritual 
consolations offered by religious explanations of death (for instance, notions of the 
afterlife and heaven). He ultimately confronts the realities of his death: its inexorable 
nature and his powerlessness in the face of death, his bodily decay, and his lack of 
crucial knowledge about life and death. Jack longs to have eternal life, and to know 
the nature of the transcendent which controls human life. In his call for a return to an 
intimate knowledge of the body’s corporeality and to ways of confronting and coping 
with mortality, he hints at his personal belief in a transcendent power that holds the 
answers to the meaning of existence. 
The lack at the centre of the self is revealed through the varied but consistent 
voices of longing and nostalgia in the novel. The ineluctable nature of human 
yearning is a central motif in Underworld which begins with DeLillo’s claim that 
history is the consequence of “[l]onging on a large scale” (11). Character Matt Shay 
poignantly comments on the underworld of baseball: “what is always there beneath 
the spatial esthetics and the mind-modeling rigor of the game, beneath the 
forevisional bursts of insight – an autoworld of pain and loss” (Underworld 457). 
                                                 
41 In “Postmodern Religion?” Bauman details three ways through which this is realized. Firstly, death 
has been removed from the public sphere and placed in the hands of various experts. Then, it has been 
broken down into manageable portions in the attempt to defeat or delay its destructive process. Lastly, 
death has become a familiar spectacle in the media, resulting in emotional immunity. 
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Cotter Martin’s desire to witness the game between the New York Giants and the 
Brooklyn Dodgers coalesces with that of the crowd going to the same game, 
accompanied by “their own small reveries and desperations” (Underworld 11). 
Present here in the first section of Underworld entitled “The Triumph of Death” is a 
powerful sense of the incompleteness of the soul – assaulted by infinite desires, 
yearning to be fulfilled, it is temporarily eased by the emotions aroused by a game, 
“the mingling of pleasure and dread and suspense” (15). DeLillo also uses Peter 
Bruegel’s painting The Triumph of Death to thematically ground the novel, casting it 
in the gloom of the bomb and establishing a parallel between the scene in the painting 
and the mass spectators of the baseball match. DeLillo indirectly affirms the mass 
awe generated by the baseball game, sympathizing with the spectators’ need for 
communal worship and wonder. 
The trope of the baseball represents the coveted object which passes through 
several individuals, each character perceiving it as having the ability to complete his 
self. Critic Jesse Kavadlo notes: “Nick Shay’s relentless pursuit of the baseball – a 
kind of American Holy Grail – is the primary expression of the restless religious 
impulse evident in Mao II. His search for innocence lost becomes a transpersonal 
symbol that embodies the capacity for faith itself” (102). Marvin, himself a collector 
of baseball memorabilia, also realizes that his collection of memorabilia is actually 
his resistance against the “dark shape of some unshoulderable loss” (Underworld 
191-192), his denial of the loss of his wife Eleanor. The compulsion to accumulate 
objects can actually be the attempt to ward off the painful feelings of loss, the 
collected items being a form of temporary substitute for the original lost object. The 
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collection of memorabilia indicates the desire to retain a part of the past, to re-
member. The baseball also unveils an underlying scheme “connecting many things” 
(Underworld 131), indicating that our longings implicate and affect others as well, 
and that we are all connected by the same fundamental sense of the loss of the sacred. 
Dominated by the ubiquity of the supermarket and the shopping mall, the fictional 
characters in White Noise erroneously turn to material reality to meet their spiritual 
needs; hence shopping helps Jack Gladney “grow in value and self-regard” (84), 
albeit only for a transient moment. Consumer products are ultimately ineffective in 
filling the gap in the human soul. The fear of death drives Jack’s wife, Babette, to 
copulate with Dylar project manager Willie Mink, a “weary pulse of a man, a 
common pusher now, spiky-haired, going mad in a dead motel” (White Noise 307). 
Again, there is a sense of the futility, absurdity, and desperation of human existence.  
The impulse for transcendence reveals human desires that have yet to be 
fulfilled, and that the transcendent fills a gap in the human soul. The final section of 
Underworld exemplifies the intense human urge for transcendence as “the hope that 
grows when things surpass their limits” (818). When the billboard on which dead girl 
Esmeralda’s image used to appear becomes blank, there is suddenly a spiritual 
vacuum and a loss of direction: “What a hole it makes in space. People come and 
don’t know what to say or think, where to look or what to believe” (Underworld 824). 
For Sister Edgar, the transcendent experience is crucial as a means of circumventing 
her doubts and gradual loss of faith in God (Underworld 824). To critic Mark Osteen, 
DeLillo is “studiously neutral” (258) here, offering not a judgment of the veracity of 
the apparition, but only provocative questions about the nature of belief. However, 
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DeLillo’s characters seem to affirm a transcendent reality despite the doubts they may 
have about it. In the face of melancholy, one may also be driven to utopian visions 
and imaginings: “Utopia is a response to a sense of disorder, and it offers an inverted 
mirror image of a disoriented mind” (Lepenies viii). Some examples are Karen 
Janney and the Moonies in Mao II, and members of “The Names” cult in The Names. 
These are the various means through which the self seeks to be completed. 
Kristeva describes melancholia as “an abyssal suffering that does not succeed 
in signifying itself and, having lost meaning, loses life” (Black Sun 189). As the loss 
occurs while the subject is unable to differentiate itself from the chora, he remains 
attached to the Thing, and feels “an unsymbolisable, unnameable narcissistic wound” 
(Black Sun 12) rather than the loss of an object independent of himself. Subsequently, 
he is unable either to objectify his loss, or to symbolize or represent it.42 The 
melancholic only “has the impression of having been deprived of an unnameable, 
supreme good, of something unrepresentable” (Black Sun 13), but he is unable to 
signify it through language. He is hence incapable of substituting for the lost Thing or 
articulating his loss. Without access to the symbolic realm, the subject fails to achieve 
subject-object distinction and falls into a state of non-differentiation akin to Freud’s 
death drive. Sadness offers a temporary centre. Affects, like sadness, protect the 
Thing whose loss highlights a failure to mourn the mother adequately and identify 
with the father.  
                                                 
42 Kristeva analyses the works of artist Holbein and poet Nerval to show her theory in praxis. 
According to her, Holbein’s minimalist style points to his lack of symbolic means to stand apart  from 
death/loss. Rather, he forces the viewer to confront the brute reality of death. Nerval’s poem also 
gestures at the amorphous Thing, but his use of poetic resources is an attempt to reach the realm of 
signs and is hence potentially therapeutic.   
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The character Brian Glassic in Underworld experiences an inexplicable lack at 
the centre of existence despite a secure and well-planned life. This is character 
Marvin Lundy’s diagnosis of Brian’s sense of loss and dislocation:  
You think you’re missing something and you don’t know what it is.  
You’re lonely inside your life. You have a job and a family and a fully 
executed will, already at your age, because the whole point is to die 
prepared, die legal, with all the papers signed. Die liquid, so they can 
convert to cash. You used to have the same dimensions as the 
observable universe. Now you’re a lost speck. You look at old cars and 
recall a purpose, a destination. (Underworld 170).  
Brian is directionless, goalless, swept along by a “middling drift” (Underworld 177), 
his trajectory determined by external forces instead of his inner motivation. This 
sense of loss, deeply felt but not easily articulated, is also experienced by Nick Shay 
during a walk in a picnic grounds: “I felt a sadness I could not exactly locate, a 
feeling that could have been mine or could have been theirs, the little families with 
food on paper plates, the unhappy man slouched on the bench, the place itself, the 
bench itself, the trash cans that didn’t have lids” (Underworld 554). In fact, 
Underworld can be seen as an attempt to comprehend the past through the articulation 
or symbolizing of loss. The narrative shifts restlessly between the past and the 
present, as if trying to probe human history in order to uncover the origins of desire, 
and to recover what has been lost. In Nick Shay’s words: “Don’t underestimate our 
capacity for complex longings. Nostalgia for the banned materials of civilization, for 
the brute force of old industries and old conflicts” (Underworld 286). There is a 
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longing that can never be satisfied, for a paradise which we have not experienced, but 
which we nevertheless believe to exist. There is perpetual yearning which cannot be 
satisfied because of the finitudes and disappointments of human existence. Even as 
life becomes more routinely and settled for Nick, there remains a gap: “I long for the 
days of disorder. I want them back, the days when I was alive on the earth, rippling in 
the quick of my skin, heedless and real” (Underworld 810). He desires the creative, 
even if it is chaotic. Nick reminds us of Mao II’s Bill for whom literature means 
being drunk and having sex: “Remember literature […] It involved getting drunk and 
getting laid” (122). 
According to Kristeva: “Knowingly disinherited of the Thing, the depressed 
person wanders in pursuit of continuously disappointing adventures and loves; or else 
retreats, disconsolate and aphasic, alone with the unnamed Thing” (Black Sun 13). 
For instance, in Mao II, Karen Janney plunges from spiritual fervour to 
disillusionment with Reverend Moon, drifts into a relationship with Scott Martineau, 
desires character Omar Neeley, preaches Moonie beliefs again to the poor, and 
returns at the end of the novel to Bill’s house, sad and drained, looking “like hell” 
(Mao II 220). She shifts from one object to the next in the effort to complete her 
being, but never finding satisfaction. In The Names, Owen Brademas is described by 
another character James Axton as being “in touch with grief […] He expressed things 
out of it and through it” (19). Perpetually feeling incomplete because of his inability 
to fully engage himself in a spiritual experience, Owen ends up lost and inarticulate in 
India after a close encounter with the “The Names” cult which opens his eyes to the 
idea that “[t]he means to contend with death has become death” (The Names 308). 
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Owen is a picture of despair at the end of the novel – confused, all his rational 
structures of thought collapsed, diminished in “life-strength” (The Names 309). In 
Underworld, Nick Shay’s spiritual quest for meaning expresses itself through his 
sexual adventures with Klara Sax as well as his need for a father figure. Having lost 
his biological father, he searches for a father figure substitute throughout his life, 
looking to characters like George Manza. George “always had a word for Nick, some 
advice to give, regards to your mother, stay in school” (Underworld 690), and Nick 
reciprocates his affections “because there was something about George the Waiter 
that Nick found interesting” (Underworld 722). There is grief as well as fear in 
Nick’s response to the loss of his father. Psychiatrist Peter Whybrow notes the 
similarity between grief and fear:  
 Grief does feel like fear, because it grows from the same root. The loss  
of somebody important, especially where there is strong emotional  
 attachment, evokes a primitive fear – of being alone and vulnerable to 
 danger, or of a changing social order where one’s own position may 
 become insecure. The protest of grief grows out of that fear; it is a cry  
for assistance, an attempt to retrieve personal balance and accord with  
others. (8)  
In an incidental conversation with Donna, a woman with whom he has an affair while 
on a job assignment, Nick refers to the Christian mystical text The Cloud of 
Unknowing. Nick recognizes God’s unimaginable immensity and the impossibility of 
human knowledge of God – the essence of negative theology. The unknowability of 
God makes faith necessary. Hence, he “tried to approach God through his secret, his 
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unknowability” (Underworld 295). Following the teachings in The Cloud, he embarks 
on a “romantic” (Underworld 296) quest for a single word of a single syllable which 
would focus his thoughts on God and initiate his “edging into darkness” (Underworld 
297). His search for the one word leads him to todo y nada, through which he 
perceives the similarity between sex and spirituality – the presence of ecstasy within a 
secret communion with another. Nick then links spirituality with sex in their common 
secrecy, privacy, ecstasy, and mystery: “sex is the one secret we have that 
approximates an exalted state and that we share, two people share wordlessly more or 
less and equally more or less, and this makes it powerful and mysterious and worth 
sheltering” (Underworld 297). Nick’s quest can be seen as an effort to channel his life 
energies into one idea which would enable him to address the transcendent Being of 
the divine.  
The lost object of DeLillo’s characters seems to be a certain fullness of being 
and perfection of knowledge, both of which death has foiled. Unable to signify the 
loss, the subject shifts from one substitute to another in the “exasperated attempt to 
complete being” (Bataille 89). According to French writer and philosopher George 
Bataille, the primary way being accomplishes this is through eroticism, whereby the 
self is affirmed through the other. The consequences are often self-destruction, 
violence, and even “waste” (Jenks 95). Owen Brademas, Karen Janney, Bill Gray, 
Jack and Babette Gladney, and the Shay brothers are examples of characters who 
attempt to complete being but fail, imprisoned in the same miasma of confusion and 
emptiness with which they started. In Underworld, Nick Shay refers to “the sharp dart 
of longing love” (298), an expression taken from The Cloud of Unknowing. For The 
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Cloud’s anonymous author, God “may well be loved, but not thought” (14), and the 
single-syllabled word he proposes we dwell on is really an intense and powerful 
prayer which “pierceth the ears of Almighty God” (54) when it issues from the depths 
of the human spirit. A desire and love for God is the only way to approach him, and 
not through reason. Nick’s quest can hence be seen as an act of faith in attempting to 
reach a divine and transcendent Being. 
In light of this, Underworld’s ending with the word “peace” (827) takes on 
new meanings. Malin and Dewey view it as unironic while Osteen sees it as offering 
“a tentative hope” (259). I read the entire concluding section as a longing, or a deep 
prayer, for peace which the narrator suggests cannot be attained. He attempts “to 
imagine the word on the screen becoming a thing in the world, taking all its meanings 
[…] but it’s only a sequence of pulses on a dullish screen and all it can do is make 
you pensive – a word that spreads a longing through the raw sprawl of the city and 
out across the dreaming bourns and orchards to the solitary hills” (Underworld 827). 
Peace remains a word on the computer screen, unmaterialized in reality. It also harks 
back to Nick’s spiritual quest for a word which would draw him closer to an 
enigmatic God. Perhaps the novel’s ending with a word suggests that just as man can 
never comprehend the totality of God, peace can never be completely actualized in 
this world. What is left for us to do, what we can do, is to transform our 
consciousness through meditation on this word – this perhaps would move us nearer 
the ideal and the divine. Underworld can hence be read as Nick’s struggle to find 
God, and to seek redemption in the end. 
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The Alchemy of Melancholia 
Through the cathartic process of art, DeLillo creates an aesthetic of 
melancholia; the language which evokes despair also generates pleasure. DeLillo’s 
description of his character Wilder’s inexplicable seven-hour crying in White Noise 
exemplifies how melancholia can be aestheticized. Containing a quality of 
“something permanent and soul-struck,” this “sound of inbred desolation” (White 
Noise 27) is the soul’s melancholic cry. That is, the melancholia issues from the self’s 
spiritual depths, possessing an atavistic quality which suggests that its origins lies in 
the roots of human history. Jack views Wilder’s crying as a form of “saying nameless 
things in a way that touched me with its depth and richness. This was an ancient dirge 
all the more impressive for its resolute monotony. Ululation” (White Noise 78), and 
perceives an implicit language in it. He also associates it with exile and spiritual 
revelation: “It was as though he’d just returned from a period of wandering in some 
remote and holy place, in sand barrens or snowy ranges – a place where things are 
said, sights are seen, distances reached which we in our ordinary toil can only regard 
with the mingled reverence and wonder we hold in reserve for feats of the most 
sublime and difficult dimensions” (White Noise 79). Crying releases one into another 
realm of spiritual ecstasy, solitude, and fulfilment. In his representation of 
melancholia, DeLillo also uses language that is romantic, poetic, and replete with 
figures of speech. The reader experiences pleasure in the writer’s conjuring up of 
beautiful images and stimulation of the imagination.  
In DeLillo’s fiction, humour and irony are sources of aesthetic pleasure which 
often occur with melancholia. In Mao II, Bill engages in a conversation with three 
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unsuspecting veterinarians about his fictional character with a lacerated liver (205-
210), all the while ironically obtaining a diagnosis of his own demise. However, it is 
also an example of how pain can be transmuted into something beautiful and 
pleasurable for the reader through black humour. The pleasure is not limited to that 
derived from the release of repressed feelings (as has been discussed previously in 
chapter 1), but also that derived from literary aesthetics. In White Noise, the beauty of 
DeLillo’s language prevents the novel from collapsing into utter bleakness in the end: 
“In the altered shelves, the ambient roar, in the plain and heartless fact of their 
decline, they try to work their way through confusion” (326). The repetition of a 
prepositional phrase climaxes in the acknowledgement of man’s physical 
degeneration. The word “shelves” can also be associated with “selves,” suggesting 
that the self has undergone external and internal changes. There is parodic humour 
and irony in the juxtaposition of democracy with queuing to pay: “this is where we 
wait together, regardless of age, our carts stocked with brightly coloured goods” 
(White Noise 326). In The Names, Tap’s creative work in the novel’s final section is a 
representation of Owen’s spiritual struggles, and the latter’s melancholy is made into 
an aesthetic object through Tap’s modified language and re-writing of Owen’s 
encounter with the charismatic manifestation of tongues. 
 Kristeva acknowledges that art could indicate a denial of loss, but contends 
that beyond that, art offers a means of moving beyond melancholia through the 
creation of beauty (Black Sun 99-100). In addition to softening one’s sensitivities, art 
is able to provide a “sublimatory hold over the lost Thing” (Black Sun 97). For 
Kristeva, melancholia results from a crisis of representation and signification, during 
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which one is incapable of articulating his painful loss. Kristeva asserts that one might 
be able to reconcile the loss of the Thing through “primary identification” with the 
“father in individual prehistory” (Black Sun 13) – the imaginary father who is, in the 
words of critic McAfee, “the image of the logic of identification” (67). If one can 
successfully enter the realm of signs, he would then be able to overcome his 
depression. In this context, works of art may have a therapeutic function in 
overcoming melancholia, both for the artist and the observer.43  
Kristeva identifies three artistic devices that allow the artist and spectator to 
secure “a sublimatory hold over the lost Thing”: firstly, there is prosody, “the 
language beyond language that inserts into the sign the rhythm and alliteration of 
semiotic processes”; second ly, the polyvalence of sign and symbol, “which unsettles 
naming and, by building up a plurality of connotations around the sign, affords the 
subject a chance to imagine the non-meaning, or the true meaning, of the Thing”; and 
finally, the aesthetics of forgiveness (Black Sun 97). She considers poetic language a 
model of “conquered depression” (Black Sun 65) for the artist and the spectator: 
“through melody, rhythm, semantic polyvalency, the so-called poetic form, which 
decomposes and recomposes signs, is the sole ‘container’ seemingly able to secure an 
uncertain but adequate hold over the Thing” (Black Sun 14). If the melancholic is able 
to reach the realm of signs and name the Thing that he mourns, he can then 
successfully overcome depression, since the ability to represent the Thing shows the 
possibility of substitution and identification. In Kristevan terms, a work of art exhibits 
                                                 
43 The artistic process tends more towards catharsis than elaboration (Black Sun 24). While catharsis is 
the release of emotional tensions, elaboration is “naming suffering, exalting it, dissecting it into its 
smallest components” (Black Sun 97).  
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defeated depression if it succeeds in putting the unnameable loss into signs, whereas 
it is melancholic if it impedes symbolic representation.   
The aestheticization of melancholia by DeLillo’s characters can hence reflect 
an attempt to incorporate the lost object into themselves, hence evading the 
experience of loss. DeLillo’s aesthetics seems to be an attempt to assuage or diminish 
the pain of existence. While he deeply acknowledges the loss in human life, he also 
transmutes it into literary language that gives pleasure. Hence, DeLillo’s narratives 
can be read as forms of defeated depression. I am not referring to the author’s mood 
which I cannot determine; rather, embedded in DeLillo’s texts are signs of a 
transcendent Being whom the characters yearn for. DeLillo’s characters aestheticize 
their loss, conforming to Kristeva’s description of the melancholic artist who 
triumphs over his debilitating condition: “His discourse identifies with [the lost 
Thing], absorbs it, modifies it, transforms it: he takes Eurydice out of the melancholy 
hell and gives her back a new existence in his text/song” (Black Sun 160). For 
instance, in Underworld, Edgar Hoover’s fascination with a reproduction of Peter 
Bruegel’s painting The Triumph of Death is scatalogical and necrophilic, paradoxical 
too considering his aversion towards germs and dust. From a psychoanalytic 
perspective, Hoover’s attraction to death can be seen as a manifestation of his 
repressed desires for disintegration and dissolution of the self. However, art also gives 
pleasure, in this case, by the transformation of death’s morbidity into aesthetic 
beauty. The scene of death becomes “a landscape of visionary havoc and ruin” 
(Underworld 41).     
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 Hence, we find that in Underworld, one possible response to loss and 
depletion is recycling, exemplified in Brian’s vision to “make a park one day out of 
every kind of used and lost and eroded object of desire” (Underworld 185). This same 
drive can be found in Klara Sax’s installation of 230 painted de-activated military 
planes which once carried nuclear bombs. What was previously a means of mass 
destruction has now become a thing of beauty and aesthetic pleasure; waste bceomes 
art. Klara alludes to J. Robert Oppenheimer’s notion of “merde”: “something that 
eludes naming is automatically relegated […] to the status of shit. You can’t name it. 
It’s too big or evil or outside your experience” (Underworld 77). Loss that cannot be 
signified is located as waste according to Oppenheimer’s definition. Yet loss can be 
re-defined – by painting the bombers, Klara reclaims them, and transforms their status 
as symbols of portent and death. In this way, her art recontextualizes lost or dead 
items. Life is hence affirmed: “millions of components stamped out, repeated 
endlessly, and we're trying to unrepeat, to find an element of felt life, and maybe 
there's a sort of survival instinct here, a graffiti instinct – to trespass and declare 
ourselves, show who we are” (Underworld 77).  
However, Kristeva also acknowledges that the sublimatory effects may only 
be temporary: “Even the soundest among us know just the same that a firm identity 
remains a fiction” (Black Sun 257). Human identity is fragile, and so are our efforts to 
signify and objectify in order to substitute for lost Things. Character Lenny Bruce in 
Underworld is the “mortician-comic” (546) who transforms the morbid into 
aesthetically pleasing humour. Yet, DeLillo describes him in an ironic moment as 
standing “on the great stage in his stupid white suit, small and remorseful” 
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(Underworld 633), self-deprecating and disdainful of his own jokes. Lenny eventually 
ends up “naked on his toilet floor, limbs gone stiff, mucus trailing out of his nose, his 
glassy eyes wide open, the syringe still stuck in his arm” (Underworld 574); he had 
died of morphine poisoning. The comedian who provides pleasure for his audience is 
finally unable to fully defeat his own melancholia. Nevertheless, art provides a means 
through which one can symbolize his sadness and hence enter a community of 





















How is it possible to speak of a transcendent entity, or even God, in this post-
mythological contemporary age? DeLillo’s texts offer some answers to this highly 
fascinating and crucial question. Through their investigation of the dialectic of 
scepticism and belief, they evidence faith and belief despite pervasive cynicism. Man 
is caught in the borderland between the material and the transcendent – a re-telling of 
the American frontier narrative.44 While DeLillo doubtlessly exhibits ambivalence 
towards some transcendent experiences and questions the different forms of human 
accessibility to a world beyond, the over-arching sense is that he still points us to the 
existence, validity and accessibility of a transcendent reality. DeLillo’s parodic style 
reveals his characters’ belief even while it satirizes, challenges, and questions aspects 
of spirituality. His sceptical-parodic engagement with “feeling spiritually large” 
(White Noise 155), as character Jack Gladney puts it, is not mere unbelief, but an 
open-ended mock form. We can see authorial identification with Jack and sympathy 
for him even as DeLillo pokes fun at him. For DeLillo’s characters, humour could be 
a defensive strategy against scepticism by hiding one’s sincerity, which is highly 
vulnerable in an age of postmodern scepticism. Parody offers a means through which 
one can espouse open expression of what one actually believes in or desires to believe 
in, but finds difficult to acknowledge.  
                                                 
44 See Frederick Jackson Turner’s The Frontier in American History and Leo Marx’s The Machine in 
the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America. 
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 Despite his unsparing elucidation of the inadequacies and dangers of 
alternative religious movements, most clearly seen in The Names and Mao II, DeLillo 
sympathizes with his characters’ spiritual hunger and their attraction to these 
religions. Deeply conscious of the limits of man’s reasoning processes in 
apprehending the transcendent, DeLillo’s texts appear to ultimately affirm the need 
for spiritual faith. DeLillo’s literary melancholia points to a loss of fundamental 
existential wholeness in his subjects. Resacralizing efforts can be read as attempts to 
recover the lost Object which is the “old God” (Mao II 7). Spiritual longing is hence 
indicative of belief in a transcendent. However, the desperate urge to transcend one’s 
material life is often inadequately consummated. I argue that DeLillo’s characters 
create an art of “conquered depression” (Black Sun 65) – their aesthetics shows that 
they have brought the unnameable Thing into the realm of signs. In this way, 
aesthetics can be temporary therapy for depression since it indicates the 
writer/reader’s ability to symbolise his loss. However, aesthetics is unable to provide 
a permanent coherence to human life, and hence it ultimately fails to address the loss 
that still haunts.  
I have attempted to read DeLillo’s texts in a new light by exploring how they 
negotiate belief with scepticism, contrary to other critical readings which view them 
as either undecided about the nature of transcendence, or emphasizing the need for 
redemption. I have chosen to draw on psychoanalytic theories as they offer a way of 
articulating what may not be explicitly stated, to speak of what is hidden and in the 
substrata of conscious existence. The common criticism against psychoanalytic 
readings of literature is that they may lead us to read too much into a text. However, 
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DeLillo’s texts offer scope for psychoanalytic interpretations grounded in textual 
evidence. I recognize that I have used the psychoanalytic theories as support for 
arguments related to the religious and spiritual, but I believe that textual evidence in 
DeLillo’s fiction justifies this methodology. Considering that DeLillo has neither 
explicitly commented on his personal spiritual affiliations nor identified a clear 
religious belief, I cannot establish any of these aspects in a deterministic fashion. 
Rather than the author’s psyche, what my reading focuses on is how DeLillo’s texts 
evidence belief amid intense scepticism.  
 I believe that my study of scepticism and belief in DeLillo’s writings will also 
open up doors for future research. DeLillo manifests postmodernist symptoms both 
stylistically and thematically. However, he critiques the strand of postmodernism that 
is too sceptical to acknowledge the human urge for transcendence, and how 
postmodern culture has exhausted itself in its infinite deferral of truth and 
undermining and levelling of all things. DeLillo’s fiction reminds us of postmodernist 
writers who negotiate space for spiritual discourse within a predominantly sceptical 
postmodernist field inimical to the transcendent. Instead of postmodern aporia, 
DeLillo also aligns himself with the possibility of the existence of transcendent 
realities which man cannot completely access but which exist nevertheless, 
possessing a conception of the sacred transcendent as multi- faceted. The nature of 
these suprahuman realities (not necessarily limited to the notion of an omnipotent, 
omniscient, and all-knowing God) can be related interestingly to several philosophers 
like Martin Heidegger and Lyotard. The kaleidoscopic nature of his vision bespeaks 
of different human longings and of divinity which does not stagnate at a single 
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definition but is fluid, constantly evolving and mutating. This ensues from the 
deficiencies and limitations of human cognition – we can never fully grasp the nature 
of the sacred, our knowledge being partial and always in want of the missing link to 
complete the vision. To fix a sacred immanence would be to erroneously emphasize 
one aspect and overlook others; this would also mean that power is attributed to 
particular forms of knowledge – a Foucauldian critique often present in DeLillo’s 
discourse. There needs to be a more open conception of the divine which allows for 
other voices apart from official or traditional ones.  
 Derridean deconstruction, for instance, celebrates heterogeneity that unsettles 
endlessly and leaves one with no easy assurances. The notion of différance exposes 
the instability of our epistemological and ontological foundations by revealing the 
ceaseless translatability and substitutability of language, situating us in an open-
endedness in which we need to learn to grope our way. In negative theology, the tout 
autre (or the wholly other) assumes the name of God. In philosopher Jacques 
Derrida’s interpretation, the tout autre is also caught in this undecidability, resisting 
determinacy and closure. The name of God is hence subjected to translation and 
undergoes a splitting into manifold forms. This condition of undecidability also 
makes the concept of faith necessary; however, it is not a comfortable faith (this 
phrase being oxymoronic in Derrida’s terms), but one which is marked by struggle, 
tears, and wrestling – it is a voice in the desert which proclaims the inchoate and the 
impossible instead of the concrete. The transcendent takes on infinite forms; it is also 
the impossible and the inconceivable. In his ruminations, Derrida, too, affirms faith as 
the expectation of what we cannot know but only believe: “I don’t know, one has to 
 99 
believe” (“Je ne sais pas, il faut croire”) (Memoirs of the Blind 129), and faith as “the 
passion of non-knowing” (Cinders 75). Like Derrida’s concepts, DeLillo’s fiction is 
open and receptive to the indeterminable transcendent, affirming the notion of faith in 
the face of what man cannot hope to know.  
Can we then place DeLillo in the tradition of American transcendentalism 
which was based on “a monism holding to the unity of the world and God, and the 
immanence of God in the world” (Hart and Leininger 674)? For the 
transcendentalists, the self is all-encompassing, “a microcosm containing within itself 
all the laws and meaning of existence” (Hart and Leininger 674). As American writer 
Ralph Waldo Emerson famously elucidates in “Nature”: “Standing on the bare 
ground, my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space, all mean 
egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents 
of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God” (6). 
DeLillo can be related to transcendentalism in certain aspects, but he cannot be 
convincingly pigeon-holed there. He resembles the transcendentalists in his openness 
to spiritual forces which are larger than man, but he does not embrace the 
transcendent as readily or easily as they do. DeLillo’s fiction calls for a faith which is 
balanced by scepticism: although his texts show a consistent fascination with the 
transcendent event, they do not aspire to the God-like consciousness of the 
transcendentalists. 
DeLillo does not present a choice between scepticism and belief, but rather 
the two perspectives interacting with each other to create a spectrum of possibilities. 
In a scene from White Noise, character Jack engages in a conversation with a black 
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Jehovah’s Witness, about how to spend his resurrection and identifying the wicked by 
the way they rot. Jack finds it “prissy to be quoting statistics in the face of powerful 
beliefs, fears, desires’ (White Noise 136) but is disturbed by the black man’s “eerie 
self-assurance” (White Noise 137). Discomfited, he questions the absence of 
scepticism in belief, and resists the Jehovah Witness’ evangelical zeal: “Is this the 
point of Armageddon? No ambiguity, no more doubt. He was ready to run into the 
next world. He was forcing the next world to seep into my consciousness” (White 
Noise 137). DeLillo’s fiction affirms belief, but not the end of questioning. Doubt is 
the defining trait of the postmodern mind, yet DeLillo is eventually unwilling to 
relinquish the evanescent or the unthinkable, choosing instead to proffer faith in the 
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